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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OF THE 
JUSTICES OF THE REHNQUIST NATURAL 
COURT 
Jason J. Czarnezki* 
William K. Ford** 
Lori A. Ringhand*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The interpretive or judicial philosophies of Supreme Court 
Justices can be thought of as "packages of beliefs" about how to 
interpret the law, packages that go by names like formalism, 
originalism, and textualism. 1 Given the reasonable assumption 
that a judge's judicial philosophy could matter for how he or she 
will decide cases, the judicial philosophy of a nominee to the Su-
preme Court is of great interest to members of the Senate who 
vote on a nominee's confirmation. Figuring out a nominee's ju-
dicial philosophy is, consequently, one purpose of the confirma-
tion hearings in the Senate, and Senators often claim to base 
their votes on their assessments of a nominee's judicial philoso-
phy. During Justice Ginsburg's hearings, for example, Senator 
Joseph Biden, then chair of the Judiciary Committee, said the 
following: "A Senator has not only the right, but the duty to 
weigh carefully a nominee's judicial philosophy and, even more 
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1. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford. The Phantom Philosophy~ An Em-
piriwl!nvestigarion of Legal Interpretation. 65 MD. L. REV. 841,850 (2006). 
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importantly, the consequences of that philosophy for the coun-
try."' 
Many Supreme Court observers believe, however, that 
nominees reveal little useful information at their confirmation 
hearings.' While an occasional nominee (such as Robert Bork) 
will discuss his or her views in detail, most nominees are more 
guarded." Nominees repeatedly refuse to answer specific ques-
tions, or to disclose information about how they would vote in 
particular cases. For example, Sandra Day O'Connor refused to 
state how she "might vote on a particular issue which may come 
up before the Court," and additionally declined to "endorse or 
criticize specific Suprem[ e] Court decisions presenting issues 
which may well come before the Court again."' Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg said, "[a] judge sworn to decide impartially can offer 
no forecast, no hints, for that would show not only disregard for 
the specifics of the particular case, it would display disdain for 
the entire judicial process."" Antonin Scalia even resisted ques-
tions about whether Marbury v. Madison represents a settled 
principle of law.' 
Obviously, what types of questions the Senators should 
ask- or the nominees should answer- is far from clear. Few, 
2. The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, lO Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United Swtes: Hearings Bej(Jre the S. Comm. on the .Judiciary, 103d Cong. 
114 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings]. 
3. See, e.g .. Grover Rees III. Questions j(Jr Supreme Court Nominees at Cunfimw-
tion Hearings. Exd111ling the Constitwion, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 91g (19R3); William G. 
Ross. The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings: 
Proposals (iJr Acwmmodming the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the 
Nominees. 62 TL:L. L. REV. 109. 109 (19R7). See generally Todd L. Wheeler, I Can't: Ethi-
wl Responses and the Roherts Confirmation Hearings, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1067 
(2006}. 
4. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL. ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 96-97 (2005). 
5. Rees. supra note 3. at 919 (quoting The Nomination of .Judge Sandra Day 
O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as an Associate .Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
Swtes: Hearings BejiJre the S. Comm. on the .Judiciary, 97th Con g. 57 (19R1) [hereinafter 
0 'Connor Hearings]). 
6. Wheeler. supra note 3. at 1077 (quoting Ginshurg Hearings, supra note 2) (al-
teration in original). 
7. Nomination of .Judge Anwnin Scalia, to Be Associate .Justice of the Supreme 
Court o( the United States: Hearings Bej(1re the S. Comm. on the .lruliciary, 99th Cong. at 
33-34. R3-R4. RR (19R6) [hereinafter Swlia Hearings]. Other nominees were not so coy 
about Marbury. See, e.g .. The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy w Be Associate .Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United Swtes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. un the .Judiciary. 
lOOth Cong. 93 (19R7) [hereafter Kennedy Hearings] (statement of Judge Kennedy) 
("Marbury v. Madison is one of the essential structural elements of the Constitution of 
the United States. As we all know. the doctrine of judicial review is not explicit in the 
Constitution. I have very little trouble finding that it was intended."). 
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however, disapprove of questions about a nominee's judicial phi-
losophy. Consider Senator Specter's comments during Ken-
nedy's hearings: 
On the subject of judicial philosophy, our introductory state-
ments today have already negated to some extent the conclu-
sion of harmony in these hearings. You have already heard a 
fair difference of views. And the first question I asked of you 
when you and I sat down to talk- and I thank you for the al-
most 3 hours we spent together in two extensive sessions. The 
first question I asked you was whether you thought that judi-
cial philosophy was an appropriate subject for inquiry. You 
said you thought that it was, and we proceeded to talk. And I 
did not ask you about your views on any specific cases, and I 
would not in private or in public. But I do believe that there 
are broad parameters which are appropriate for discussion.' 
During these same hearings, Senator Leahy described this in-
quiry into judicial philosophy as the most important one at the 
hearings, saying that " [ n ]o issue is more central to a decision on 
the appointment of a Justice."" And while some Senators have 
expressed reservations about the scope of questions relating to 
judicial philosophy, 1" as Senator Specter's comment suggests, 
R. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 6K Specter then went on to describe a simi-
lar experience with Robert Bork: "That was the first question I asked of Judge Bork as 
well, whether he thought judicial-we were talking about judicial ideology at that time. 
and Judge Bork said in response that he did not like the term ·ideology' because it had 
political connotations, but he thought judicial philosophy was an appropriate subject for 
inquiry." /d. 
9. Kennedy Hearings. supra note 7. at 59. Leahy described the term "judicial phi-
losophy" as "[a nominee's] approach to the Constitution. and to the role of the Supreme 
Court in discerning and enforcing its commands." !d. 
10. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2. at 219 (statement of Sen. Cohen) ("The 
additional question that we are seeking to probe is that of your judicial philosophy .... 
But even that examination of philosophy is not without its limits .... What I think we are 
trying to do, and are only really qualified to do. is to examine your philosophy to deter-
mine whether we find it so extreme that it might call into question those other requisites 
that I mentioned before [e.g .. intelligence. competence. and temperament]."). Senator 
Hatch seemed potentially hostile to questions about judicial philosophy early in Ken-
nedy's hearings. He said: 
I just want to make a recommendation to you. There are a lot of comments 
about how you will have to go into philosophy here. and you are going to have 
to go into judicial theories. and concepts, and that you can treat them any way 
you want to. 
Let me just say this: I think we, as a committee, have to refrain from delving 
mto your personal views with regard to constitutional doctrine. 
Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 41. However, Hatch later asked questions about 
original ism. questions clearly going to the topic of judicial philosophy. See id. at 1 '!2 
("And so I would ask you. in your opinion. whose intent does govern. or whose meaning 
does govern?"): id. at 193 ("Let me just say the cases may evolve. circumstances may 
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many others have emphasized the legitimacy of the topic. 11 In 
general, however, questions about interpretive methods such as 
the role of precedent or legislative history do not provoke ex-
plicit reactions of impropriety. 12 So while Senate confirmation 
hearings have numerous purposes, discovering a nominee's judi-
cial philosophy is clearly one of them. 1.• But this raises a basic 
question: Do the exchanges between the nominees and the Sena-
tors actually reveal anything useful about a nominee's judicial 
philosophy? 
Despite the importance of this question, surprisingly little 
work has been done comparing the statements made by nomi-
nees at their confirmation hearings with their subsequent behav-
ior on the Supreme Court. If the hearings reveal substantively 
valuable information about nominees' views, then we would ex-
pect to find a relationship between the Justices' statements and 
their judicial decisions. This Article is an initial look at that rela-
tionship. Specifically, we examine statements involving the 
nominees' views on stare decisis, originalism and legislative his-
tory, and also statements involving their views on the rights of 
criminal defendants. We then rank order the nominees' confir-
mation hearings statements on these issues, and evaluate 
whether the rankings correlate with the Justices' voting patterns 
or, in the case of legislative history, the content of their opinions. 
Given the focus of this Symposium-Empirical and Mathemati-
cal inquiries of the Rehnquist Court-we focus on the Rehnquist 
change. doctrines may change. applications of the Constitution may evolve. but the Con-
stitution itself does not evolve unless the people actually amend it. Do you agree with 
that''"). 
11. See, e.g., Ginshurg Hearings. supra note 2. at 114 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("I 
have said many times and I want you to know that I believe my duty obliges me to learn 
how nominees will decide, not what they will decide. but how they will decide. This obli-
gation for Senators to inquire into and understand the judicial philosophies of a Supreme 
Court nominee is neither new nor disputed any longer .... " ) (emphasis added): Ken-
nedy Hearings. supra note 7, at 71 (statement of Sen. Heflin) ("Judge Kennedy, in these 
hearings you will be questioned on your views of the Constitution. your judicial philoso-
phy. your commitment to equal justice under law.''). 
12. See. e.g .. Kennedy Hearings. supm note 7. at 141 (statement of Judge Kennedy) 
(''Well. 1 do not wish to resist your line of questioning [about original intent], because I 
think it is very important: it goes to the judicial method."). 
13. See EPSTEIN & SEGAL. supra note 4. at 90. One purpose not mentioned thus far 
is Senator DeConcini's concern that a nominee is a "listener." See The Nomination of 
David 1-1. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United State.1·: Hear-
ings BefiJre the S Conzm. on the Judiciary. 101st Cong. 133 (1 \NO) [hereinafter Souter 
Hearings] (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("I want to say. Judge. you have said many im-
pressive things today: many of them have left a very favorable impression with me. Most 
important to me is that you are very convincing. that you are a listener: nothing is more 
important in communication than to listen."). 
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Natural Court (the period from 1994 to 2005 when the same nine 
Justices served together). 14 This focus allows for consistent com-
parison of voting and decisionmaking patterns among the nine 
Justices. 
Part II of this Article provides a description and historical 
account of the Rehnquist Natural Court and its Justices- Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Part II also exam-
ines the various purposes other than revealing judicial philoso-
phies that the confirmation hearings may serve. Part III 
describes our quantitative dataset, methodology and results, in-
cluding our use of blind surveys to rank confirmation hearing 
statements. Since we know of no other study that attempts to 
measure confirmation hearing statements, we hope this sympo-
sium piece facilitates further discussion on how one might best 
evaluate confirmation hearing statements, and, thus, how we 
might improve upon our preliminary methodology (e.g., improv-
ing the survey instrument, including other areas of law, changing 
the population of the survey participants, or finding other ways 
besides surveys to operationalize confirmation hearing state-
ments). Part IV explains and uses a different methodology. This 
Part compares confirmation hearing statements about the role of 
legislative history with the percentage of authored cases invok-
ing legislative history. Part V discusses our conclusions and pre-
sents suggestions for additional research. 
II. THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AND THE 
REHNQUIST NATURAL COURT 
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist presided over the 
U.S. Supreme Court longer than any other Chief Justice in the 
twentieth century. 1' His Court at various times included Justices 
as different from each other as William Brennan, Thurgood 
Marshall, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence 
Thomas. From 1994 to 2005, however, the same nine Justices-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, 
14. A "natural Court" is a period of time during which the membership of the 
Court remains stable. LEE EPSTEI~ ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA. 
DECISIONS. AND DEVELOPMENTS 313 (1st ed. 1994). 
15. Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure over the Court was in fact the fourth longest in 
history: John Marshall presided over the Court for 34 years (lHOl to 1835); Roger 
Taney's term lasted 2H years (1 H36 to 1 H64 ): Melville Fuller's term extended 22 years 
(11-lHH-l<JlO): and Justice Rehnquist's lasted 19 years (l<JH6 to 2005). See RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES I vii (6th ed. 2000). 
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Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer-sat together. 
This extraordinary period-eleven terms without any change of 
personnel- constituted the second longest natural court period 
in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. 1" 
These nine Justices were nominated by five different presi-
dents over the span of 23 years. 17 Control of the Senate over the 
course of these nominations also changed: Democrats controlled 
the Senate during seven of the nominations (Stevens, Thomas, 
Souter, Kennedy, Rehnquist (1971), Breyer, and Ginsburg), 
while Republicans had that honor during three (Scalia, 
O'Connor, and Rehnquist (1986)). 1" And of course, Robert 
Bork's failed confirmation hearings-widely considered a semi-
nal event in the recent history of the confirmation process-
occurred in 1987, after the Rehnq uist, 0' Connor and Scalia 
hearings, but before the hearings of the remaining Justices. 19 
16. The longest natural Court was presided over by Justice John Marshall. That 
Court lasted twelve years. from 1~12 to 1~24. See EPSTEIN ET AL.. supra note 14. at 304. 
17. President Nixon first nominated Justice Rehnquist: President Ford nominated 
Justice Stevens: President Reagan nominated Justices O'Connor. Scalia. and Kennedy. 
and also elevated Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice: President George H. W. Bush nomi-
nated Justices Souter and Thomas: and President Clinton nominated Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer. /d. at 2~9. 
1~. GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY. SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS 
OF SUPREME COuRT APPOINTMENTS 52 (1995). 
19. Contrary to some contemporary assumptions. Robert Bark was not the first 
nominee rejected or vigorously disputed on ideological grounds. Approximately 20% of 
Supreme Court nominations fail. See EPSTEIN ET AL.. supra note 14. at 173. Many of 
these fail for overtly political reasons: President Washington's effort to elevate JustJce 
John Rutledge to Chief Justice failed because of Justice Rutledge's outspoken opposition 
to the Jay Treaty. See James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Su-
preme Court Appointments. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337. 337 (19~9). President Jackson's 
nomination of Roger Taney, while ultimately successful. faced stiff opposition because of 
a dispute between President Jackson and the Senate regarding reauthorization of a na-
tional bank. See A Great Judicial Character, Roger Brooke Taney, 1~ YALE L.J. 10, 16-17 
(190~). President Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis in 1916 was almost derailed by 
the American Bar Association's opposition to his sociological style of jurisprudence 
(magnified by its anti-Semitism). See generally John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis 
D. Brandeis. 17 STAN. L. REV. 6~3 (1965). John Parker's nomination was rejected in 1930 
because of the opposition of organized labor and the NAACP. See Richard L. Watson. 
Jr.. The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Swdy in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50(2) MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 213, 213-14 (1963). Two of Richard Nixon's nominees (Clement 
Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell) had similar difficulties. See Stephen L. Wasby & 
Joel B. Grossman. Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: New Perspective on His Nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court. 1990 DUKE L.J. 74. 74: Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Ajji1ir: 
The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the Nixon Administration. 42 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 261.261 (199~). The widespread assumption that confirmation hearings are 
now more "political" than in the past may be attributable to the increase in interest 
group participation in the hearings. See Lee Epstein. Jeffrey A. Segal. Nancy Staudi & 
Rene LindsUidt. The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (2005). Thus, it is not clear to some of 
the authors that Judge Bark's failed nomination was in fact the watershed event it often 
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Not surprisingly given these varied political contexts, the 
content of the confirmation hearings for the nine Justices dif-
fered, both in style and substance. Justices O'Connor and Scalia 
were confirmed by unanimous votes in a Republican-controlled 
Senate.2" Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Thomas's hearing, in contrast, were vigorously contested 
and each of these Justices won Senate approval by relatively nar-
row margins. 21 The nominations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
initiated by a Democratic president and confirmed by a Democ-
ratic Senate, were much less contentious.22 The issue areas fo-
cused on during the confirmation hearings also varied a great 
deal. For example, questions about abortion were more promi-
nent in the later hearings than in the earlier ones, while ques-
tions about the use of legislative intent in statutory interpreta-
tion increased dramatically after Justice Scalia's confirmation. 
Despite the rich research possibilities created by these hear-
ings, there is little scholarship examining the substantive content 
of them.2' Much of the existing literature uses empirical analysis 
to examine the role of the Senate in the confirmation process. 
but does not attempt to analyze and compare the nominees' sub-
stantive statements at their hearings, much less compare those 
statements themselves to the nominees' subsequent voting re-
cords once on the Court. The legal literature likewise has ne-
glected this area. Although there is an abundance of law review 
articles discussing the confirmation process and the Senate's role 
is portrayed as. 
20. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14. at 290; .1ee also Charles M. Cameron. Albert D. 
Cover & Jeffrey Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional 
Mot!el. H4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990). 
21. Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice by a Senate vote of 65 to 33. 
Justice Thomas was confirmed by a Senate vote of only 52 to 4H. EPSTEII' ET AL .. supra 
note 14, at 290. 
22. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are widely believed to have been "consensus 
nominations," meaning that President Clmton solicited input from Republican Senate 
leaders (particularly Sen. Orrin Hatch) before nammg his choices. See Janet Malcolm. 
The Art of Testifying: The Confirmation Hearings as Theatre. THE NEW YORKER. Mar. 
13. 2006. at 70. 
23. Several books have been published in the past few years examining the nomina-
tion and confirmation process. These books include: RICHARD DAVIS. ELECTI~G 
JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS (2005): 3 FEDERAL 
ABORTION POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY. JLDICIAL NO~I'IATIONS (Neal 
Devins & Wendy L. Watson eds .. 1995): LEE EPSTEit'> ET AL.. THE SLJPREME COLRT 
COMPENDIUM: DATA. DECISIO!':S. AND DEVELOPMENTS (4th ed. 2007): EPSTEIN & 
SEGAL. supra note 4: DENIS STEVEN RLTKUS & MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER 
JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS: U.S DISTRICT AND CIRCLIT Cot:RTS. 1977-2002 
(2004). 
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in it, we are aware of none that attempt to connect confirmation 
hearing statements to subsequent judicial behavior. 24 
This Article is a first step in remedying that oversight. We 
are aware, of course, that there is much going on at the Justices' 
confirmation hearings that does not involve sincere efforts by 
Senators to gain information about the sincere preferences of 
nominees. We assume, for example, that Senators are (among 
other things) satisfying interest groups by voicing their con-
cerns,2' signaling policy preferences to the Court as a whole,2" 
and strengthening or weakening other Senators commitment to 
the nominee.27 And the nominee, of course, is attempting to get 
confirmed. Nonetheless, one goal of the hearings clearly is to 
generate information about how a nominee will answer constitu-
tional questions if confirmed. 2" We believe it is worthwhile to ex-
amine the extent to which this goal is being met. 
III. SURVEY-BASED ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
A. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
We reviewed the complete printed transcripts of the Senate 
confirmation hearings for the nine members of the Rehnquist 
Natural Court.2~ We included Justice Rehnquist's hearings for 
24. This rich literature includes Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Examining the .!wlicial 
Nomination Process: The Politics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1992): Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt. Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process. 50 
DUKE L.J. 1687 ( 20(J1): Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehemive Understanding of 
the Federal Appointments Pruc:ess. 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1998); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Pulling Presidential Perjimnance in the Federal Appointments Process in Per-
spective. 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1359 (1997): Richard D. Manoloff. The Advice and 
Consent of the Congress: Toward a Supreme Court Appointment Process ji1r Our Time. 
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087 (1993): William G. Ross. The Senate's Comtitutional Role in Con-
firming Cahinet Nominees and Other Executive Ojjicers. 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123 
(1998); and Gerald Walpin. Take Ohstructionism Out of the .lwlicial Nominations Con-
firmation Process. X TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89 (2003). 
. 25. See Mary Sherris. Colorado Repuhliwn Federal Campaign Commillee v. Federal 
Election Commission: Maintaining What Remains of' the Federal Election Campaign Act 
Through Constillltional Compromise. 30 AKRON L. REV. 561. 561 (1997). 
26. See Neal Devins. Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress~. 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1337, 1338 (2006). 
27. Margaret Williams & Lawrence Baum. Questioning .Judges Ahout Their Deci-
sions: Supreme Court Nominees Beji~re the Senate .Judiciary Commillee. 90(2) 
JUDICATURE 73.74-75 (2006). 
28. See supra text accompanying notes 3. 9 and 12: see also Williams & Baum. supra 
note 27. at 75. 
29. Transcripts of Nomination Hearings for Supreme Court Justices are available at 
the following web address: http://www.senate.gov/pagelayoutlreference/one_item_and_ 
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both his Associate Justice and Chief Justice nominations. After 
reviewing the transcripts of the hearings, we extracted all the 
statements related to the nominees' commitment to stare decisis, 
commitment to originalism, and commitment to the protection 
of the rights of criminal defendants. With the help of student 
volunteers, we then set out to rank order the nominees in terms 
of their commitment to these three items. We were not only in-
terested in the rank order of the Justices (e.g., who made state-
ments indicating a preference for originalism, who objected to 
originalism, and who fell in between), but also in the spatial dis-
tances of their ordering (e.g., while Justices may dislike the ex-
clusionary rule to varying disagrees, those that object to it out-
right are closer in space to each other than those who wish to see 
the doctrine modified). 
In order to achieve these ordinal and spatial rankings, we 
took the statements extracted from the transcripts and created 
three packets of quotations, one each for stare decisis, original-
ism, and the rights of criminal defendants. Each packet con-
tained one page of quotations per justice. In some instances, the 
quantity of relevant text for a Justice exceeded our limit of one 
page. As we did not want to overwhelm the students with text 
and risk that they would not read the quotations carefully, we 
removed repetitive or extraneous material. Just as the initial 
process of identifying relevant statements in the transcripts in-
volved some subjective judgments, so too did this process of par-
ing down the statements to a single page of quotations. Unless 
we were to ask the students to read the entire transcript for each 
Justice, which clearly was not feasible, the subjective nature of 
this process was unavoidable. The consolidated quotations for 
each packet are fully disclosed in Appendix A. 
We distributed these packets of quotations to 119 second 
and third year law students. Each student received one packet. 
For reasons of cost and convenience, students are often used as 
stand-ins for the general population, especially in experimental 
h '" F h l researc . or our purposes, owever, aw students offered ex-
teasers/Supreme_Court_Nomination_Hearings.htm. 
30. See. e.g. Greg Pogarksy & Linda Babcock. Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, 
and Bargaining Impasse. 30 J. LEGAL STUDIES. 143, 150 (2001) (using a convenience 
sample of 462 undergraduate and graduate students from the "University of Arizona's 
business college. the MBA program at the University of Chicago. and the Harvard Busi· 
ness School subject pool (consisting of undergraduates in the Boston area)"); Michael E. 
Morrell. Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory 
Mee1.1 Empiriwl Science. 52 POL. RES. Q. 293, 303 (1999) (using a convenience sample of 
"undergraduates enrolled at a major southwestern university"); Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe 
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pertise that the general population lacks. Nevertheless, consid-
erations of cost and convenience played a role here too. Law 
professors or experienced appellate practitioners, for example, 
would offer even greater expertise, but students are more acces-
sible. 
Students were not told the source of the quotations or even 
that they came from the nine Justices on the Rehnquist Natural 
Court. Instead, the instruction sheet handed out with the packet 
stated as follows: "The United States Senate has held dozens of 
confirmation hearings for potential Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court. Attached are quotations from the confirmation 
hearings of nine of those nominees. "' 1 By not telling the students 
the sources of the quotes, pre-existing conceptions of individual 
Justices should not have affected the students' responses. In-
deed, one of the primary reasons for asking to students to evalu-
ate the statements rather than evaluating the statements our-
selves was to avoid the potential effects of being familiar with 
the nominees' later behavior. 
Students were asked to read the quotations contained on 
the sheets attached to the instructions and do one of following, 
depending on which topic area that they were randomly as-
signed: 
(1) Rank each nominee's relative commitment to stare de-
cisis. 
(2) 
(3) 
Rank each nominee's relative commitment to using 
originalism as a method of constitutional interpreta-
tion. A commitment to "originalism" as a method of in-
terpretation should be understood for these purposes 
as a Justice's commitment to interpreting the Constitu-
tion as it was understood by the Framers and/or the 
public at the time of its enactment. 
Rank each nominee's relative commitment to protect-
ing the rights or interests of criminal defendants. 
M. Oxley, & Rosalee A. Clawson, Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL. 
BEHA v. 221, 229 (1997) (using a convenience sample of 116 undergraduates enrolled 111 
political science courses): Ellen D. B. Riggle & Mitzi M. S. Johnson, Age Difference in 
Politic:al Decision Making: Strategies j(1r Evaluating Political Candidates, 18 POL. BEHA V. 
99,104 (1996) (using a convenience sample of 40 young adults enrolled in undergraduate 
political science courses and 40 older adults from a volunteer subject pool). 
31. The instruction sheet for each packet is available and on file wah authors. 
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Students ordered the Justices (i.e., each sheet) from 1 to 9, 
with 1 representing the Justice showing the least commitment to 
stare decisis, originalism, or the rights of criminal defendants, 
and with 9 representing the greatest commitment. No two Jus-
tices could receive the same number.'2 The students' rankings 
yielded an average score for each Justice somewhere between 1 
and 9 (generated by calculating the sum of student rankings for a 
given Justice, divided by the number of students ranking that is-
sue area). These average scores, found below in Tables A, D, 
and G, provide a measure of the relative commitment of each 
Justice to the three issue areas as stated in their confirmation 
hearings. 
Having thus developed a relative ranking of the Justices' 
levels of commitment based on their confirmation hearing 
statements, we next needed something to compare those com-
mitment levels to. We opted to compare the commitment rank-
ings to the Justices' individual votes as derived from political sci-
entist Harold Spaeth's Supreme Court Database, as modified for 
one co-author's prior projects.'' We rely on voting data from the 
1994-2004 Terms (the Rehnquist Natural Court period). These 
data allow us to count the Justices' individual votes to overturn 
existing precedent (to compare to the stare decisis commitment 
rankings), to track the ideological direction of the Justices' votes 
in criminal cases (to compare to the rights of criminal defen-
dants' commitment rankings), and to calculate agreement rates 
between Justices in constitutional cases (to compare to the 
originalism commitment rankings).'4 Each of these comparisons 
is discussed in turn below. 
B. STARE DECISIS 
As stated in the Introduction, if confirmation hearings re-
veal substantively valuable information about the nominees' ju-
dicial philosophies, then (assuming the nominees' views remain 
constant) one should expect a strong correlation between the 
Justices' relative commitments to particular interpretive ap-
32. Most students took between 35 and 45 minutes to complete the exercise . 
. 33. A list of changes made to the publicly available Spaeth Database is available at 
http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand/ChangestoDataset.doc. 
34. We considered measuring the Justices' commitment to protecting the rights of 
criminal defendants by looking at the ideological direction of each Justice's votes in 
criminal cases across the entire span of the Justice's career. We opted against this, how-
ever. because Spaeth's directional coding is relative, meaning that a Justice's vote will be 
liberal or conservative only in relation to the other possible outcome in the case as pre-
sented. 
138 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:127 
proaches and their judicial behavior on the bench. We evaluate 
this possibility here in relation to the nominees' views on stare 
decisis. Justices whose confirmation hearing statements ranked 
them as the most committed to stare decisis should vote to in-
validate relatively fewer existing precedents than those Justices 
whose statements ranked them as less committed. 
The Justices' relative commitments to stare decisis, as de-
termined by the student rankings of their confirmation hearing 
statements, is shown in Table A below. As illustrated, Justice 
Rehnquist showed the least commitment to precedent, obtaining 
an average student ranking of only 2.949. Justices Ginsburg and 
Scalia showed the greatest commitment, with each of these Jus-
tices achieving a 5.564 average. The differences between the 
nominees are not sharp, however. All but one of the nominees 
are located within the middle third of the range, i.e., from 4.0 to 
6.0. 
Table A: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing 
Statements: Commitment to Stare Decisis/Precedent 
Justices Average Score Std. Min. Max. Dev. 
Rehnquist 2.949 2.127 1 9 
Souter 4.333 2.579 1 9 
Stevens 4.436 2.280 1 9 
O'Connor 4.564 2.349 1 9 
Thomas 5.026 2.211 1 9 
Kennedy 5.026 2.631 1 9 
Breyer 5.026 1.899 1 9 
Scalia 5.564 2.654 1 9 
Ginsburg 5.564 2.162 1 9 
Scale= 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N = 39. 
If confirmation hearing statements provide useful informa-
tion about future judicial behavior, we would expect based on 
these rankings that Justice Rehnquist would vote to invalidate 
the most precedents, while Justice Scalia and Ginsburg would 
vote to invalidate the fewest. An examination of the Justices' 
votes to overturn precedent shows that this is only partially 
borne out. Using the modified Spaeth database, we counted the 
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Justices' votes to overturn precedent in cases decided in the 1994 
through 2000 Terms in which all nine Justices participated." A 
Justice's vote is counted as a vote to alter precedent if the Justice 
writes or joins an opinion specifically stating that an earlier case 
is being or should be "overruled," as well as decisions stating 
that past precedent should be "disapproved" or is "no longer 
good law. ,v> Decisions in which an opinion distinguishes an exist-
ing precedent from the case at bar are not counted.'7 
Table B reports the results based on the Spaeth data. Of the 
535 cases decided from 1994 to 2000 by all nine Justices, Justice 
Thomas cast the most votes to invalidate precedent ( 4.3% of the 
cases) and Justice Souter cast the least (1.3% of the cases). 
Based on only the percentage of votes to overturn precedent and 
without regard to the importance of any particular vote, Thomas 
appears to be the Justice least committed to precedent. This re-
sult seems plausible, based on the substance of his votes. Thomas 
has, for example, suggested reconsideration of well-established 
precedents such as Calder v. Bull (1798}" and Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co. (1921).''' He also has suggested reconsider-
ing the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to a greater ex-
tent than the other Justices in the majority in United States v. 
Lopez:" though in Lopez he conceded that stare decisis might 
prevent a return to the original understanding (as he sees it) of 
the Commerce Clause.' 1 Interestingly, the five "conservative" 
members of the Rehnquist Natural Court occupy the five highest 
slots in terms of altering precedent, supporting earlier findings 
that the Rehnquist Court was an "activist" court in that it ag-
gressively used its power to invalidate existing precedents.'2 The 
35. This time frame obviously does not include the entire Rehnquist Natural Court 
period. but it is the only time frame for which reliable data were available. 
36. See Sara C. Benesh & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court Justice-Centered 
Judicial Databases: The Warren. Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1953-2000 Terms) 31 
(March 2003) (prepared for the S. Sidney Clmer Project for Research in Law and Judi-
cial Politics. University of Kentucky). http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ 
flpdcodebk pdf. 
37. !d. 
3H. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel. 524 U.S. 49H. 53H-39 (199H) (Thomas. J .. concur-
ring). 
39. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods .. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg .. 545 U.S. 30H. 320-
22 (2005) (Thomas. J .. concurring). 
40. Compare 514 U.S. 549. 549-6H (1995) (majority opinion). with id. at 5H4-603 
(Thomas. J .. concurring). 
41. lrl. at 601 n.H (Thomas. J .. concurring) ("Although I might be willing to return 
to the original understanding. I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day 
to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare 
decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean."). 
42. The "conservative" Justices on the Rehnquist Natural Court voted to overturn 
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four ··moderate/liberal" Justices, on the other hand, each voted 
to alter precedent less than two percent of the time."' 
Table B: Votes to Alter Precedent: 1994 through 2000 Terms 
Whether Justice 
Voted to 
Alter Precedent 
No Yes Total %Altered 
Thomas 512 23 535 4.3% 
Scalia 516 19 535 3.6% 
Kennedy 519 16 535 3.0% 
Rehnquist 523 12 535 2.2% 
O'Connor 523 12 535 2.2% 
Breyer 525 10 535 1.9% 
Stevens 526 9 535 1.7% 
Ginsburg 527 8 535 1.5% 
Souter 528 7 535 1.3% 
Total 4699 116 4815 2.4% 
Note: Includes only cases in which all nine Justices participated. 
As shown in Table C below, only Justices O'Connor, Breyer 
and Ginsburg placed near where their confirmation hearing 
statements indicated they would. Justice Rehnquist, whose con-
firmation hearing statements showed a notably low commitment 
to precedent relative to his fellow Justices, was in the middle of 
the pack in actual practice. Justices Scalia and Thomas, as noted 
above, were far from their presumptive positions. 
more precedents and to invalidate more federal statutes than did their more "liberal'" 
colleagues See Lori A. Ringhand. Judicial Auivism on the Rehnquist Nawral Court. 24 
Co:--;sT. CO\-IME:--;T. (forthcoming Spring 2007). Since "conservatives" control the major-
ity of the Court. they may seek to grant cert. to cases where they seek to reverse more 
liberal precedent. Given that these more conservative Justices can control the docket. 
thev are free to vote in accordance with their views of slllre decisis as stated in their con-
firn;atJon hearings. However. the "liberals." to the extent they fear a conservative Court 
decision. may n~t wish to grant cert. in cases they otherwise would prefer hearing in or-
der to reverse Court precedent. 
-l3 !d. 
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Table C: Comparison of Rankings versus Actual Votes to 
Overturn Precedent 
Least Survey Ranking %Altered 
Committed Precedent 
to Precedent 
1 Rehnquist (2.949) Thomas (4.3%) 
2 Souter ( 4.333) Scalia (3.6%) 
3 Stevens ( 4.436) Kennedy (3.0%) 
4 O'Connor (4.564) O'Connor (2.2%) 
141 
5 Thomas (5.026) Rehnquist (2.2%) 
6 Kennedy (5.026) Breyer (1.9%) 
7 Breyer (5.026) Stevens (1.7%) 
8 Scalia (5.564) Ginsburg (1.5%) 
9 Ginsburg (5.564) Souter (1.3%) 
Most 
Committed 
The overall correlation between the Justices' commitments 
to stare decisis as measured by their confirmation hearing rank-
ings and the actual number of votes cast to overturn precedent is 
weak: 0.289. Confirmation hearing statements about a nominee's 
purported commitment to stare decisis appear to reveal very lit-
tle about how most nominees will vote once on the bench. 
C. 0RIGINALISM 
Most members of the Rehnquist Natural Court spoke at 
length at their confirmation hearings about originalism as an in-
terpretive method, though Justice Stevens discussed the issue 
much less than his colleagues. While all of the Justices hedged 
their comments a bit, there was interesting variety in their state-
ments. Justice Thomas, for example, offered the ambivalent 
statement that "[o]ur notions of what [the liberty clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] means evolves with the country, it 
moves with our history and our tradition.""" Justice Ginsburg of-
44. The Nomination of Clarence Thomas 10 Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court ol the United States: Hearings Be/iJre the S. Comm. on the Judiciary. 102d Cong. at 
274 (19'11) [here•nafter Thomas Hearing.1]. 
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fered up a somewhat confusing weather analogy: "[W]hat a judge 
should take account of is not the weather of the day, but the cli-
mate of an era. The climate of the age, yes, but not the weather of 
the day, not what the newspaper is reporting."45 Justice O'Connor 
made perhaps the strongest pro-originalism statement, saying: 
I do not believe that it is the function of the judiciary to step in 
and change the law because the times have changed or the so-
cial mores have changed, and ... I believe that on occasion the 
Court has reached changed results interpreting a given provi-
sion of the Constitution based on its research of what the true 
meaning of that provision is- based on the intent of the fram-
ers, its research on the history of that particular provision.4" 
Based on these and other statements, the students ranked 
the Justices' relative commitments to originalism as an interpre-
tive method.'7 As shown in Table D, Justice Ginsburg ranked as 
the Justice least committed to originalism, with an average rank-
ing of only 2.447. Justice O'Connor showed the greatest per-
ceived commitment, with an average ranking of 6.947. 
TableD: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing 
Statements: Commitment to Originalism 
Justices Average Score Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Ginsburg 2.447 1.606 1 7 
Souter 4.211 2.506 1 9 
Kennedy 4.237 2.696 1 9 
Stevens 5.079 2.019 1 9 
Rehnquist 5.158 2.736 1 9 
Thomas 5.395 2.087 1 9 
Scalia 5.684 2.157 1 9 
Breyer 5.842 2.319 2 9 
O'Connor 6.947 2.514 1 9 
Scale = 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N = 38. 
45. Ginsberg Hearings. supra note 2, at 303. 
46. O'Connor Hearings. supra note 5. at 67. 
47. The students were provided with the following definition of originalism: "A 
commitment to 'originalism' as a method of interpretation should be understood for 
these purposes as a Justice's commitment to interpreting the Constitution as it was un-
derstood by the Framer's and/or the public at the time of its enactment." 
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Measuring a Justice's commitment to originalism, or any 
other judicial philosophy, is quite difficult, since what counts as 
an originalist outcome is likely to be disputed in many cases.4H 
Here, we consider the extent to which one Justice joined a con-
curring or dissenting opinion written by a second Justice. This 
information-agreement with concurrences and dissents ("spe-
cial opinions') written by another Justice- focuses precisely on 
whether the agreeing Justices had similar rationales for a deci-
sion. The decision to join a majority opinion does not always tell 
us much about whether a Justice agrees in any great depth with 
the analysis presented in the opinion; a decision to join a special 
opinion is a more finely tuned tool, one that almost certainly in-
dicates agreement not just with the outcome but also with the 
reasoning. Justices who agree with each other's reasoning proc-
esses should be more likely to join each other's special opinions. 
Of the 278 constitutional cases we examined, the average 
agreement rate between all of the Justices in special opinions is 
2.3%. As can be seen in the shaded areas in Table E below, 
however, certain Justices joined the concurring or dissenting 
opinions of their peers at a much greater rate than the average. 
Justice Thomas joined the concurring or dissenting opinions 
drafted by Justice Scalia 15.5% of the time. Justice Ginsburg 
joined the non-majority opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens 
at rates of 10.1% and 11.5%, respectively. 
4H. See generally Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 1. 
Authors 
-
ter Stevens Thomas Rehn uist 
1.1% I 4.7% 3.2% 0 1.1% 
4.7% 4.3% 0.4% 1.4% 
1.1% 1.1% 2.2% 2.9% 
5.0% 1.4% 1.8% 2.5% 1.1% 2.2% 4.0% 
Scalia 0.4% 1.1% 1.8% 2.2% 15.5% 4.0% 
Souter 5.8% 10.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 
Stevens 5.8% 11.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0 0.4% 
Thomas 0 0 1.8% 0.7% 8.3% 0 
ist 0.4% 0 2.2% 1.8% 2.2% 0 0 
Note: N=278 cases. Includes only cases from Rehnquist Natural Court, and only cases in which the 
constitutionality of a state (including state subdivisions) or federal action was the sole issue presented to 
the court. "Agreed" means that the named Justice joined a concurring or dissenting opinion authored by 
the other Justice 
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If the Justices' commitments to originalism as expressed in 
their confirmation hearings is manifesting itself in their constitu-
tional opinions, we would expect to see higher agreement rates 
in special opinions between Justices with similar originalism 
rankings:y We would, in other words, expect to see some corre-
lation between the Justices who expressed similar levels of 
commitment to originalism as an interpretive method (i.e. closer 
ranking scores) and the willingness of those Justices to join the 
reasoning in special opinions written by Justices with similar lev-
els of commitment. To test this possibility, we first determined 
the differences in the originalism scores for each pair of Justices. 
For example, Souter and Kennedy's originalism scores were 
relatively close together, while O'Connor and Ginsburg's scores 
were relatively far apart. We then looked at how often the Jus-
tices in each pair signed on to one another's special opinions. 
The smaller the difference between two Justices' originalism 
scores, the more often they should join each other's special opin-
ions. Table F contains the results. 
4'!. We do not mean to imply that originalism can in fact answer all (some of the 
authors would add "or most") constitutional questions; it plainly cannot. See Robert M. 
Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Origina/ism, 36 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 113 
(2002). We assert only that Justices claiming an adherence to originalist methods should 
agree with the reasoning of other Justices claiming an adherence to such methods. 
[ -- ----------Score Opinions Score Opinions 
.T ustice Pair Diff. Joined Justice Pair Diff. Joined 
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As shown above, Justices Souter and Kennedy had the closest 
originalism rankings, yet joined each other's concurring or dis-
senting opinions only six times. By contrast, some Justice pairs 
with wide originalism score gaps agreed with each other fre-
quently (e.g., Ginsburg-Breyer; Stevens-Ginsburg). It turns out 
that these originalism scores do not correlate with agreement 
rates between Justices. 
D. THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
The last issue area we tested using the student ranking was 
the commitment of the Justices to protecting the rights of crimi-
nal defendants. Unlike originalism and stare decisis, this part of 
the project tested the Justices' views about a particular area of 
law, rather than their purported commitment to an interpretive 
approach or methodology. We were interested in whether this 
type of questioning -questions about particular issue areas 
rather than judicial philosophy-provided useful information 
about future judicial behavior. As in our discussion of stare de-
cisis above, we tested whether Justices whose confirmation hear-
ing statements expressed a strong preference for protecting the 
rights of criminal defendants (e.g., indicated support for 
Miranda, the exclusionary rule, or similar protections) were in 
fact more likely to vote to protect criminal defendants in crimi-
nal cases. 
The ranking of the Justices' relative commitments to the 
protection of criminal defendants (based again on their confir-
mation hearing quotes) is shown in Table G below. As illus-
trated, Justice O'Connor showed the least commitment to the 
rights of criminal defendants, with an average score of only 
2.474. Justice Ginsburg, in contrast, showed the greatest com-
mitment, with an average score of 7.816. 
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Table G: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing 
Statements: Commitment to Protecting the Rights of 
Criminal Defendants 
Justices Average Score Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
O'Connor 2.474 1.983 1 8 
Rehnquist 3.553 2.368 1 9 
Kennedy 3.579 1.926 1 9 
Breyer 4.395 1.980 1 8 
Scalia 4.474 1.899 1 9 
Souter 5.079 1.937 1 9 
Thomas 6.684 1.919 1 9 
Stevens 6.947 1.916 1 9 
Ginsburg 7.816 1.829 2 9 
Scale== 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N == 38. 
To measure the Justices' relative commitments to protecting 
the rights of criminal defendants once on the bench, we again 
used information culled from the revised Spaeth Supreme Court 
database. The Spaeth data allowed us to identify all of the crimi-
nal law cases decided during the Rehnquist Natural Court period 
(the 1994 to 2004 Terms).'" It also identifies each Justice's vote in 
those cases as "liberal" or "conservative." A "liberal" vote in 
this category of cases is one in favor of the criminal defendant; a 
"conservative" vote is the opposite.' 1 
Not surprisingly, Justices of the Rehnquist Court commonly 
thought of as the most conservative were more likely to vote 
conservatively in criminal cases: Justices Thomas, Rehnquist and 
Scalia all voted for the conservative outcome in more than 75% 
of these cases. Justice Thomas cast the most such votes, voting 
conservatively in 78.0% of the 214 criminal cases examined. Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Conner voted for 68.7% and 66.4%, re-
spectively, while each of the "moderate/liberal" Justices voted 
conservatively in less than 45.5% of the cases. Justice Stevens 
50. "Criminal" cases are those cases which Spaeth codes as value=l. Only those 
cases in which all nine Rehnquist Natural Court Justices participated were included. 
51. See The Justice-Centered Rehnquist Court Database. 19R6-199R Terms. http:// 
www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. 
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voted conservatively the least often, doing so in only 27.1% of 
the cases.'2 
Table H: Directional Votes in Criminal Cases (1994-2004) 
Justices Conservative % Liberal % Total 
Thomas 167 78.0% 47 22.0% 214 
Rehnquist 160 76.9% 48 23.1% 208 
Scalia 161 75.2% 53 24.8% 214 
Kennedy 147 68.7% 67 31.3% 214 
O'Connor 142 66.4% 72 33.6% 214 
Breyer 97 45.5% 116 54.5% 213 
Souter 84 39.3% 130 60.7% 214 
Ginsburg 79 36.9% 135 63.1% 214 
Stevens 58 27.1% 156 72.9% 214 
Total 1095 57.1% 824 42.9% 1919 
If confirmation hearing statements are providing useful in-
formation about a Justice's future commitment to protecting the 
rights of criminal defendants, we would expect Justices who ex-
pressed the strongest commitment to such rights to cast the most 
"liberal" votes in criminal cases. As shown below in Table I, 
there is some support for this expectation. 
52. Six of Chief Justice Rehnquist's votes in these criminal cases were deemed not 
ideological codable by Spaeth. as was one of Justice Breyer's votes. This accounts for the 
disparity in the total number of votes cast for these Justices. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Rankings versus Actual Votes in 
Criminal Cases 
Least Committed to Survey Ranking %Liberal Vote 
Defendant Rights 
1 O'Connor (2.474) Thomas (22.0%) 
2 Rehnquist (3.553) Rehnquist (23.1%) 
3 Kennedy (3.579) Scalia (24.8%) 
4 Breyer ( 4.395) Kennedy (31.3%) 
5 Scalia (4.474) O'Connor (33.6%) 
6 Souter (5.079) Breyer (54.5%) 
7 Thomas ( 6.684) Souter (60.7%) 
8 Stevens (6.947) Ginsburg (63.1 %) 
9 Ginsburg (7.816) Stevens (72.9%) 
Most Committed 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both evidenced the greatest 
commitment to the rights of criminal defendants in their confir-
mation hearing statements, and both of these Justices cast the 
most votes to protect criminal defendants while on the 
Rehnquist Natural Court. Also, seven of the nine Justices fell on 
the "correct" (as predicted by their confirmation hearing state-
ments) side of the large gap in liberal voting percentages found 
between Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer. Using that gap as 
a dividing line between the Justices, only Justices Thomas and 
Breyer showed inconsistent voting patterns in these cases (Jus-
tice Breyer voted for more liberal outcomes than anticipated, 
while Justice Thomas voted for notably fewer). Overall, the cor-
relation between survey rankings based on confirmation hearing 
votes and actual votes to alter precedent is 0.5376. While this is 
only a moderate correlation, it is stronger than the correlation 
found in our stare decisis analysis and much stronger than the 
correlation in the originalism analysis. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
We also examined the Justices' confirmation hearing state-
ments in an additional area- the usc of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation. As before, we extracted the statements 
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from the hearings in which the nominees spoke about their views 
on legislative history. This time, however, we did not rely on stu-
dent evaluators. Instead, we evaluated the quotations ourselves. 
There were several reasons for taking an alternative approach 
with this topic. We were primarily concerned that we would not 
have enough student participation to include four different sets 
of quotations, but there also is some value in taking alternative 
approaches to studying this topic. In evaluating the statements 
about legislative history, however, we knew the identities of the 
speakers. While we were not conscious of any impact from this 
knowledge, we cannot rule out the possibility that it influenced 
our rankings of the nominees. 
Legislative history is one of the most common interpretive 
aids available to judges, but judges, like legal scholars, disagree 
about its proper use and even whether to use it at all." It is not 
self-evident that the differing views on legislative history actually 
matter when it comes to deciding real cases, but we proceed on 
the assumption that judges' differing views on legislative history 
may matter and therefore consider whether the confirmation 
hearings provide any insight into the nominees' subsequent use 
of legislative history once they are on the Court. 
The proper use of legislative history is discussed in seven of 
the nine nominees' hearings. There is virtually nothing on this 
topic in Stevens' hearings, but there is a ready explanation for 
this lack of discussion; The status of legislative history as an in-
terpretative aid has varied over the years. In 1930, Max Radin 
claimed that there was "no general agreement" on whether it is 
appropriate to use it in statutory interpretation. 14 In the view of 
many observers, the legal community later reached a consensus 
in favor of legislative history, and Stevens' hearings occurred 
during this period of consensus." While O'Connor and 
53. See. e.g .. Bank One Chicago. N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co .. 516 U.S. 264. 
2i\3 (1996) (Scalia. J.. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The text's the 
thing. We should therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it. instead of after 
discussing it."): Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States. 37 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (opinion by Posner. J.) ("Legislative history is in bad odor in some influential 
judicial quarters. but it continues to be relied on heavily by most Supreme Court Justices 
and lower-court judges: and in the case of statutory language as technical and arcane as 
that of the DISC provisions. the slogan that Congress votes on the bill and not on the 
report strikes us as pretty empty.") (citation omitted): Stephen Breyer. On the Uses of 
Legislative Historv in lmerpreting Stallltes. 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (19lJ2). 
54. Max Radin. Swtutory Interpretation. 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, H72 (1930). 
55. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann. The U.S Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative f-li.1tories: A Swtistical Analysis. 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 296 (19H2): Archibald 
Cox . .fudge Learned Hand and the !nterprellltion of Statutes. 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 3HO 
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Rehnquist discussed the topic, they did so only briefly. In the 
mid-80s, however, the consensus began to weaken, in large part 
because of comments made by Scalia at various law schools in 
1985 and 1986.'" And not surprisingly, Scalia spoke at length 
about the topic during his hearings. Oddly, there was virtually no 
discussion of the topic at Kennedy's hearings, even though they 
were only about a year after Scalia's, but setting Stevens and 
Kennedy aside, we found substantive comments in the other 
nominees' hearings, although Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist 
spoke only briefly on the topic. 
Of the seven nominees to address the issue, Justice 
O'Connor was the most favorably disposed towards the use of 
legislative history. She offered no qualifications on its use, such 
as a preference for limiting it to situations where the statutory 
text is unclear. Instead, she simply included it on the list of useful 
aids when interpreting statutes: "[I]t seems to me important in 
construing statutes that the Court look at the specific legislative 
enactment itself, the language used, and any legislative history 
which is available in connection with it, as aids in the proper in-
terpretation. These are crucial factors. "'7 Rehnquist, in contrast 
to O'Connor, offered the most common qualification to the use 
of legislative history, i.e., that one should look at it only when 
the statutory language is not clear." 
It is difficult to draw any rigid distinctions between the com-
ments offered by Justices Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, 
though if forced to do so, we would likely place them in the pre-
ceding order. All four nominees were generally positive about the 
use of legislative history, though each one of them offered some 
qualification beyond that stated by Justice Rehnquist. Of the four, 
Justice Thomas was perhaps the most positive, insofar as he sug-
gested the least concern about using legislative history. He did ac-
knowledge, however, that "some legislative history is perhaps 
more accurate or better than others."'" The "point" of statutory 
(1947) ("Despite earlier doubts, committee reports. committee amendments, responsible 
explanations on the floor. and similar legislative materials may now be considered by a 
federal court interpreting a statute, even when the words. taken alone, have an unambi-
guous meaning."): Legislation. 50 HARV. L. REV. H13, H26 (1937) ("A few courts have 
forbidden the use of these materials. but the strong approval of a considerable body of 
authority now points to their free employability."): 
56. See Sc:alia Hearings. supra note 7, at 74 (statement of Sen. Hetlin). 
57. O'Connor Hearings, supra note 5. at 134. 
5R Nomination oflustice William Huhhs Rehnquistto Be Chieflustice of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1H2 (19H6) (hereinafter 
Rehnquist C.l Hearings]. 
59. Thomas Hearings, supra note 44. at 213. 
2007] CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 153 
interpretation, according to Justice Thomas, is to discern Con-
gress' intent, and he did not "know how one can go about that 
process, the process of interpreting ambiguous statutes, without 
looking to legislative history. " 01 ' Justice Breyer was a bit more cau-
tious. He referenced the potential misuse of legislative history, of-
fering Judge Harold Leventhal's now cliched analogy between us-
ing lesislative history and looking for one's friends at a cocktail 
party. 1 But Justice Breyer did make clear that he believed that 
"an open question in a statute is best understood through the use 
of legislative history.""2 Thus, both Justices Thomas and Breyer 
described legislative history as an essential tool for judges strug-
gling with unclear statutory language."' 
Justices Ginsburg and Souter both endorsed the use of legis-
lative history when the text is unclear, but each of these Justices 
also emphasized the reliability of some sources over others.04 Jus-
tice Ginsburg said she approached legislative history with "hope-
ful skepticism,""' and suggested that a unanimous committee re-
port is more reliable than a statement by a single member 
(though even on this point she hedged)."" Justice Souter empha-
sized the need to find sources that represent the views of the en-
tire institution. A statement by one member on the floor is 
therefore less reliable than other sources."7 These Justices, then, 
clearly emphasized the concern that some materials are much 
less likely to reveal the thinking of Congress as a whole. Justices 
Thomas and Breyer did not ignore this concern, but they were 
somewhat less specific in their discussions of it. 
While Justice Scalia offered the most criticism of legislative 
history, he was not as hostile to it as might be expected from his 
subsequent behavior on the bench, such as his occasional refusal 
60. !d. 
61. The Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer lO Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: 1-!earings Bej(Jre the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 
171 (19'i4) ("[Judge Leventhal] said. oh. it is like going to a cocktail party and looking 
over the crowd and picking out your friends. What he is describing is a misuse of legisla-
tive history.''). 
62. /d. at 2'i6. 
63. This is consistent with the Court's decisions in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. DeL Council. 467 U.S S37. S43 n.9 (1'!S4) ("If a court. employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction. ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question 
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.") and INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 4SO U.S. 421. 432 n.12 (1 '!S7). 
64. Ginsburg 1-!earings. supra note 2. at 224. 326: Souter Hearings. supra note 13. at 
131. 
65. Ginsburg Hearings. supra note 2. at 224: see also id at 326. 
66. /d. at 224. 
67. Souter 1/earings. supra 13. at 131 
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to join sections or footnotes of majority opinions that deal with 
legislative history."x During his hearings, Justice Scalia described 
legislative history as "a significant factor in interpreting a stat-
ute," adding that he would use what seemed to him as "reliable 
legislative history when it is available to be used""" and that he 
would "not exclude it as a basis for [his] decisions as [he had] not 
in the past. "7" In large part, his comments might not be all that 
distinguishable from Justices Souter and Ginsburg. In one ex-
change, however, he did go further than those Justices in ex-
pressing his skepticism about legislative history: 
Senator Simon .... Do you still believe. if you were writing on 
a blank slate, you would call all of legislative history into 
question? 
Judge Scalia. Yes. If I could create the world anew, I suppose 
I still would, but I will no more be able to create the world 
anew when I am sitting on the Supreme Court than I could 
when I was sitting on the court of appeals, if I ever get to sit 
up there.'' 71 
Largely because of this statement, we opted to rank Justice Scalia 
as the nominee most hostile to the use of legislative history, at 
least among the seven Justices who commented on the topic. 
Thus, while the Justices' views of the use of legislative his-
tory in statutory cases cannot be ordered decisively, the Justices' 
confirmation statement can be meaningfully used to divide the 
Justices into four groups. These groups distribute the Justices in 
descending order, with the Justices most favorably disposed to 
the use of legislative history in Group One and those most skep-
tical of such use placed in Group Four. Justice O'Connor is in 
the first group since she offered no qualifications on the usc of 
legislative history, suggesting that legislative history is always a 
welcome part of any effort at statutory interpretation. Justice 
Rehnquist is in the second group, because he offered only the 
most common qualification on such use-that legislative history 
be used only when the language of the statute is not clear. Jus-
6~. See. e.g .. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.. 126 S. Ct. 1~43. 1~46 
(2006); KP Permanent Make-Up. Inc. v. Lasting Impression I. Inc .. 543 U.S. Ill. 113 
(2004): Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue. Inc .. 537 U.S. 41 K. 420 (2003): Associates Com-
mercial Corp. v. Rash. 520 U.S. 953. 955 (1997): United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fab-
ricators of Utah. Inc .. 51K U.S. 213.215 (1996). 
69. Swlia Hearings. supra note 7. at 65. 
70. /d. at 66. 
71. /d. at 105-06. 
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tices Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter comprise the third 
group due to their higher degree of skepticism about particular 
forms of legislative history; and finally Justice Scalia is in the 
fourth group for what appears to be only a grudging acceptance 
of legislative history in some situations. It is worth noting again, 
however, that Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist did not speak at 
length on this topic. If the Senators had been more persistent at 
the hearings, these groupings may have been different. 
Do the confirmation hearing statements, so grouped, match 
up with the nominees' subsequent performance on the Court? 
There are two relevant sources of systematic information on the 
use of legislative history on the Supreme Court from which to 
draw our comparison data: Michael H. Koby's The Supreme 
Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of 
Justice Scalia's Critique,' 2 and James J. Brudney and Corey Dit-
slear's The Decline and Fall of Legislative History.'' Koby's study 
provides a count of legislative history references from 1980 to 
1998.'" Included in Koby's definition of legislative history are 
committee reports, congressional debates, committee hearings, 
and the text of bills.'' Although Koby is a bit thin on his meth-
odological details, his counts appear to include both positive and 
negative references to legislative history in majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions.'h 
Table J presents Koby's results for the nine Justices of the 
Rehnquist Natural Court. Setting aside Justices Stevens and 
Kennedy, Justice O'Connor was the most frequent user of legis-
lative history, which is consistent with our examination of the 
confirmation hearing testimony. Justice Scalia used legislative 
history the least, which also matches up with the confirmation 
hearing testimony. Justice Rehnquist's position, however, is not 
consistent. One explanation is that Justice Rehnquist changed 
his view of legislative history over time. The last four years rep-
resented in Koby's data, 1995 to 1998, are the four years in which 
72. Michael H. Koby. The Supreme Cour(s Declining Reliance on Legislative His-
tory: The Impact of./ustic:e Swlia's Critique. 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999). 
73. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear. lhe Decline and Fall of Legislative His-
torv~ Pallerns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras. S9 
JUDICATURE 220 (2006). 
74. Koby. supra note 72. at 373. Koby replicates another study that is also thin on 
methodological details. See Carro & Brann. supra note 55. at 29S (describing the meth-
odology for identifying cases as relying on LEXIS searches but without providing the 
search terms). 
75. Koby. supra note 72. at 373. 
76. See id. at 392. 
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Justice Rehnquist used legislative history the least often. Thus, 
the hearings may have accurately indicated Justice Rehnquist's 
views at the time despite the fact that he changed his mind in his 
later years on the Court. Justice Thomas' results are perhaps the 
most striking. On average, Justice Thomas used legislative his-
tory in 17% of his opinions, putting him closer to Justice Scalia 
(9.3%) than Justices Breyer (34.4%), Ginsburg (32%), and 
Souter (39% ). Thus, Justice Thomas' confirmation hearing 
comments were the least revealing of his actual performance on 
the bench, as his comments during the hearings suggested he 
would be at least as favorably disposed towards legislative his-
tory as those Justices. 
Table K provides a measure of the Justices' use of legisla-
tive history based on Brudney and Ditslear's data on decisions 
from 1969 to 2005 involving the "law of the workplace." Their 
dataset includes 649 majority opinions on issues like union-
management relations, employment discrimination, and related 
subjects. Unlike Koby, Brudney and Ditslear excluded from 
their tally any opinions in which the reference to legislative his-
tory was actually a rejection of its value. Their data thus repre-
sent a smaller universe of cases, but the data are a more accurate 
assessment of the positive role of legislative history, at least in 
these "law of the workplace" cases. Based on this methodology, 
the predictive value of the Justices' confirmation hearing state-
ments appears low. With these data, Justice O'Connor now 
ranks fourth rather than second in terms of using legislative his-
tory. Based on their confirmation hearing statements, one would 
expect O'Connor to rely on legislative history more than Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Rehnquist is again closer to the 
bottom than the top. As should be expected from his confirma-
tion hearing statements, Justice Scalia's use of legislative history 
is quite low, though Justice Thomas' use is even lower. In this re-
spect, Thomas' position again does not match up with expecta-
tions based on his testimony, though it remains possible that he 
changed his views after being confirmed. In sum, the hearings 
were a mixed bag for the Senators in terms of figuring out how 
the nominees compared to one another. 
Table .J: Justices' Reliance on Legislative History (KOBY) 
Justice 1981 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
Ste\'ens 36% 28% 2J% 69% 76% 72% 40% 45% 67% 60% 30% 69% 42% 34% 48% 35% 26% 25% 27% 45% 
O'Connor 51% 56% 67% 64% 47% 57% 47% 55% 55% 54% 35% 6% 22% 10% 13% 23% 31% 41% 
Souter 75% 38% 50% 59% 17% 25% 26% 24% 39% 
Breyer 75% 47% 8% 70' lo 34% 
Ginsburg 37% 17% 22% 47% 36% 32% 
Kennedy 14% 21% 9% 63% 15% 17% 62% 27% 67% 25% 15% 30% 
Rehnquist 52% 40% 44% 46% 31% 52% 14% 38% 25% 30% 9% 37% 23% 67% 38% 6% 0% 0% 0% 29% 
Thomas 5% 13% 24% 26% 27% 13% 12% 17% 
Scalia 5% 24% 2% 16% 13% 14% 3% 9% 4% 15% 4% 3% qo1 , IO 
-------- ---------
Note Majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions are included without subject-matter restrictions. Source: Michael H. Koby, 
77u! Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: l11e Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 Harv. J on Legis. 
369, 393-94 Table III (1999). 
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Table K: Justices' Reliance on Legislative History 
(Brudney & Ditslear) 
Justice 1969-2005 
Souter 44% 
Stevens 40% 
Ginsburg 36% 
O'Connor 31% 
Breyer 29% 
Rehnquist 26% 
Kennedy 23% 
Scalia 4% 
Thomas 0% 
Note: Only majority opinions involving the "law of the work-
place" are included. Source: Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. 
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative 
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 Jurimetrics J. 292, 298 
(1981-1982). 
CONCLUSIONS 
As noted in the Introduction, Senator Leahy described the 
inquiry into a nominee's judicial philosophy as the most impor-
tant issue of the hearings.77 One would therefore hope the hear-
ings generate accurate information about the nominees that 
could actually inform a Senator's vote. While admittedly pre-
liminary, our results indicate that the confirmation hearings are 
providing very little substantive information as to future judicial 
behavior. Based on the student evaluations, Senators should 
perhaps focus their questions on specific issue areas rather than 
'big picture' issues involving interpretative methods-or at least 
expect to learn more from these questions. Our limited data 
support this recommendation in that the nominees' rankings in-
volving criminal defendants are more consistent with the nomi-
nees' subsequent behavior than the rankings involving stare de-
cisis and originalism. Based on our own evaluation of the 
statements involving legislative history, we did find some predic-
tive value in the answers provided by the nominees; however, it's 
not clear if the Justices' views on legislative history have system-
77. Kennedy Hearings. supra note 7, at 59 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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atic effects on case outcomes. These findings are interesting, in-
sofar as they offer little support for the common senatorial prac-
tice (or desire) of trying to predict judicial behavior by asking 
questions about judicial philosophy or interpretive methodol-
7H 
ogy. 
Any recommendation about questions, however, must be 
qualified. Our survey results are by no means definitive. The 
student rankings, in all three areas, show a high degree of varia-
tion. In all but five situations, each Justice received the full range 
of possible ranks in each issue area. Moreover, the standard de-
viations in the Justices' rankings were relatively high, particu-
larly with regard to stare decisis and originalism. This variation 
may support a recommendation that Senators wanting real in-
formation should focus on issue areas rather than interpretive 
methods: questions about interpretive methods (or interpretive 
methods themselves) may be so malleable that very little mean-
ingful information will be conveyed in response to such ques-
tions. There are, however, other possible reasons for the varia-
tions. It is possible, for example, that the full scope of 
information conveyed at a confirmation hearing cannot be cap-
tured by looking solely at a nominee's responses to questions. 
Context matters. It may be that in stripping the identities of the 
nominees and the nature of the questions asked (and of the 
questioner) we stripped away too much critical contextual in-
formation, thereby making it impossible for our survey partici-
pants to make meaningful distinctions between the Justices' 
statements, even though such distinctions may have been possi-
ble if more information were provided. 
Alternatively, our student rankers may not have been up to 
the task presented to them. We assumed second and third year 
law students could act as a reasonably good proxy for an inter-
ested and reasonably informed but non-expert public (the audi-
ence of constituents that the Senators themselves presumably 
care about). This assumption may not be correct. Moreover, le-
gal elites, public opinion leaders, and the Senators themselves 
may see different things in the same statements than could our 
student evaluators. If this is the case, it is possible that the con-
firmation hearing statements are in fact providing meaningful in-
7'1'.. On the other hand, Senator Simpson actually noted to Anthony Kennedy that 
"even though you hold these particular philosophies, we also know there is no predict-
ability as to how you'll act when you get on the high court bench." !d. at 50. But this ac-
knowledgement did not stop Simpson from claiming to have a significant interest in 
Kennedy's judicial philosophy. /d. 
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formation to the Senators or other groups. Repeating the survey 
with other groups, including groups with both more and less spe-
cialized knowledge, might yield interesting insights into how dif-
ferent audiences perceive the information presented at the hear-
ings. One might also use far more sophisticated methods of 
content analysis and more detailed coding schemes to assess the 
hearings, thus enabling a more context rich assessment of the 
positions presented by the nominees. 
A final point: in the end, we are not surprised by the rela-
tively weak correlations between statements made at the hear-
ings and subsequent judicial behavior. We expect that even more 
nuanced research methodologies would yield similar results. 
Confirmation hearings are, after all, a strategic environment 
where Senators ask certain questions to please constituents and 
nominees answer questions to land a job. The nominees' incen-
tives, therefore, are almost certainly to provide as little informa-
tion as possible. Moreover, even genuinely held interpretive 
preferences may make very little difference in directing results in 
actual cases. Our point, then, is not to generate astonishment at 
the lack of correlation between nomination statements and judi-
cial performance, but to stimulate thinking on how the confirma-
tion hearings could be better structured to provide more reliable 
predictors of judicial performance if, indeed, such predictors are 
a desirable or feasible way of increasing judicial accountability. 
These are the questions we hope this work provokes, and that fu-
ture researchers in this area will pursue. 
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APPENDIX A 
Breyer: Originalism 
[120] Would you agree, then, that the meaning of the law is to be 
ascertained according to the understanding of the law when it was en-
acted? A: Almost always. Almost always .... The reason that I hesitate 
a little is because of course, there are instances, particularly with the 
Constitution and other places, where it is so open and unclear as to just 
how the Framers or the authors intended it. 
[170] I think the Constitution is a set of incredibly important, in-
credible valuable principles, statements in simply language that have 
enabled the country to exist for 200 years, and I hope and we believe 
many hundreds of years more. That Constitution could not have done 
that if, in fact, it was not able to have words that drew their meaning in 
part from the conditions of the society that they govern. And, of 
course, the conditions and changed conditions are relevant to deciding 
what is and what is not rational in terms of the Constitution, as in the 
terms of a statute or in any other rule of law. 
[223] One goes back to history and the values that the Framers 
enunciated. One looks to history and tradition, one looks to the prece-
dents that have emerged over time. One looks, as well, to what life is 
like at the present, as well as the past. And one tries to use a bit of un-
derstanding as to what a holding one way or the other will mean for the 
future. 
[269] I think judges have started with text ... They go back to the 
history; they look at what the Framers intended; they look at traditions 
over time; they look at how those traditions have worked out as history 
has changed; and they are careful, they are careful, because eventu-
ally ... other people will look back at the interpretations this genera-
tion writes if they are judges and they will say: were they right to say 
that that ought permanently to have been the law? If the answer to that 
question is yes, then the judges of today were right in finding that that 
was a basic value that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have 
enshrined. 
[287] Where a clause is unclear, there is no escaping the require-
ment to find its meaning .... To find the meaning, you begin with the 
text, but as you say, the text is very unclear in the example you are 
thinking of. You go back into history, and you look at what the Fram-
ers are likely to have intended. And often -or at least sometimes, any-
way-that will not answer the question, because they may have in-
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tended the meaning to encapsulate certain important values, which 
values may stay the same, but the conditions in which they are applied 
may have changed. So you look to precedent, you look to tradition, and 
you look to history if the case is really difficult. And you have to have 
some understanding of the practical facts of how people live. 
[287] Those are intellectual checks that try to make the factors 
that I mentioned factors that do not unchain the personality of the 
judge, that hold the judge back from legislating, but permit the Consti-
tution to adapt to changing circumstances in a way that I believe the 
Framers intended. 
[355] [W]hat the Framers thought is that the Constitution should 
adapt, preserving certain basic values. So what are those values? And 
we are back to where I started with a holistic approach .... I think the 
word "dignity" is important. At the most basic level, the Preamble to 
the Constitution lists what the Framers were up to-establish justice, 
ensure domestic tranquility, proved for the common defense, promote 
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and 
our posterity. 
[192] I cannot say that precedent always answers the question, but 
it is terribly important to refer to the precedent, and the opinion grows 
out of prior precedent. That is normal. The history is important as well, 
both because it reflects an intent of the Framers and because it shows 
how, over the course of 200 years, that intent has been interpreted by 
others. The present and the past traditions of our people are important 
because they can show how past language reflecting past values, which 
values are permanent, apply in present circumstances. And some idea 
of what an opinion either way will mean for the lives of the people 
whose lives must reflect those values, both in the past and in the pre-
sent, and in the future, is important. 
Kennedy: Originalism 
[85] [T]he object of our inquiry is to use history, the case law, and 
our understanding of the American constitutional tradition in order to 
determine the intention of the document broadly expressed. One of the 
reasons why, in my view, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States have such great acceptance by the American people is 
because of the perception by the people that the Court is being faithful 
to a compact that was made 200 years ago. The Framers sat down in a 
room for three months .... The object of our inquiry is to see what that 
documents means. 
[138] The Framers, because they wrote a Constitution, I think well 
understood that it was to apply to exigencies and circumstances and 
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perhaps even crises that they could never foresee. So any theory which 
is predicated on the intent the Framers had, what they actually thought 
about, is just not helpful. Then you can go one step further on the pro-
gression and ask, well, should we decide the problem as if the Framers 
had thought about it? But that does not seem to me to be very helpful 
either. What I do think is that we can follow the intention of the Fram-
ers in a different sense. They did do something. They made certain 
public acts. They wrote. They used particular words. They wanted 
those words to be followed. We can see from history more clearly now, 
I think, what the Framers intended, than if we were sitting back in 
1789 .... We have a great benefit, Senator, in that we have had 200 
years of history. History is not irrelevant. History teaches us that the 
Framers had some very specific ideas. As we move further away from 
the Framers, their ideas seem almost more pure, more clarified, more 
divorced from the partisan politics of their time than before. So a study 
of the intentions and the purposes and the statements and the ideas of 
the Framers seems to me, is a necessary starting point for any constitu-
tional decision. 
[140] Q: Does this mean that you are in any way adverse to evolv-
ing interpretations of the Constitution that accommodate new technol-
ogy or current trends in society? A: [I] recognize that any State must 
contain within it the ability to change in order to preserve those values 
that [are deemed] essential. As applied to a judge, I think that it is con-
sistent with the idea that constitutional values are intended to endure 
from generation to generation and from age to age. 
[140] [T]he doctrine of original intent is not necessarily helpful as 
a way to proceed in evaluating a case; but that really it is one of the 
things that we want to know. The doctrine of original intent does not 
tell us how to decide a case. Intention, though, is one of the objectives 
of our inquiry. If we know what the Framers intended in the broad 
sense that I have described, then we have a key to the meaning of the 
document. I just did not think that original intent was very helpful as a 
methodology, as a way of proceeding, because it just restates the ques-
tion. 
[141] Original intent, broadly conceived as I have described it, is 
extant in far more cases than we give it credit for. I think that in very 
many cases, the ideas, the values, the principles, and rules set forth by 
the Framers, area guide to the decisions. And I think they are a guide 
that is sufficiently sure that the public, and the people accept the deci-
sions of the court as being valid for that reason. If there is not some his-
torical link to the ideas of the Framers, then the constitutional decision, 
it seems to me, is in some doubt. ... But I think that in almost all cases 
there is an intent, at least broadly stated; the question is whether it is 
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narrow enough to decide the particular case. It is, I think, an impera-
tive that a judge who announces a constitutional rule be quite confi-
dent. be quite confident, that it has an adequate basis in our system of 
constitutional rule; and that means an adequate basis in the intention 
of the Constitution. 
[151] WelL I am not saying that the official purpose, the an-
nounced intention, the fundamental theory of the amendment as 
adopted will in all cases be the sole determinant. But I think I am indi-
cating that it has far more force and far more validity and far more 
breadth than simply what someone thought they were doing at the 
time. I just do not think that the 14"' amendment was designed to freeze 
into society all of the inequities that then existed. I simply cannot be-
lieve it. 
[152] Q: Well, I agree with you about that, and I agree with you 
about Brmvn v. Board being correctly decided. A: But that cannot be 
because society has changed between 1878 and 1896 ... I think what 
the Framers had in mind was to rise above their own inJustices. It 
would serve no purpose to have a Constitution which simply enacted 
the status quo. 
[171] You look to see how the great Justices that have sat on the 
court for years have understood and interpreted the Constitution, and 
from that you get a sense of what the Constitution really means. 
[230] [The] Court can use history in order to make the meaning of 
the Constitution more clear. As the court has the advantage of a per-
spective of 200 years, the Constitution becomes clearer to it, not more 
murky .... And this doesn't mean the Constitution changes. It just 
means that we have a better perspective of it. This is no disparagement 
of the Constitution. It is no disparagement of the idea that the inten-
tions and the purposes of the Framers should prevail. To say that new 
generations yield new insights and new perspective does not mean the 
Constitution changes. It just means that our understanding of it 
changes. The idea that the Framers of the Constitution made a cove-
nant with the future is what our people respect and that is why they fol-
low the judgments of the Supreme Court, because they perceive that 
we are implementing the understanding of the Framers. I am commit-
ted to that principle. 
Thomas: Originalism 
[135] I think, Senator, that the role of a judge is a limited one. It is 
to interpret the intent of Congress, the legislation of Congress, to apply 
that in specific cases, and to interpret the Constitution, where called 
upon, but at no point to impose his or her will or his or her opinion in 
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that process, but rather to go to the traditional tools of constitutional 
interpretation, or adjudication, as well as to statutory construction, but 
not, again, to impose his or her own point view or his or her predilec-
tions or preconceptions. 
[179) But to understand what the Framers meant and what they 
were trying to do, it is important to go back and attempt to understand 
what they believed, just as we do when we attempt to interpret a stat-
ute that is drafted by this body, to get your understanding. 
[238) I think that knowing what [the Founders] views are is a con-
text for understanding our Constitution, knowing what they believed in 
is a context for understanding the separation of powers or perhaps 
even understanding the notion of limited government and the rights of 
individuals .... Now, the beliefs of the Founders could be part of the 
history or tradition to which we look, but you do not make an inde-
pendent search of natural law, and I have not suggested that. 
[273) How do we look at history and tradition, how do we deter-
mine how our country has advanced and grown, it is a very difficult en-
terprise. It is an amorphous process at times, but it is an important 
process. 
[274) I also indicated that the concept doesn't stop there, it is not 
frozen in time. Our notions of what [the liberty clause of the 14th 
Amendment] means evolves with the country, it moves with our history 
and our tradition. 
[274) The concept [of natural law) is a broad concept .... maybe 
that is one of the reasons the Founders used that concept. It is one that 
evolves over time. I don't think that they could have determined in 
1866 what the term in its totality would mean for the future .... but in 
constitutional adjudication, what the courts have attempted to do is to 
look at the ideals, to look at the values that we share as a culture, and 
those values and ideals have evolved, in that specific provisions have 
evolved over time. 
[277) Q: So, natural law does impact on the adjudication of cases? 
A: To the extent that the Framers believed it. Q: We both admit, you 
looking at the Framers and me looking at the Framers, we may come to 
two different conclusions of what they meant by natural law. A: But we 
also agree that the provisions that they chose were broad provisions, 
that adjudicating through our history and tradition, using our history 
and tradition evolve. 
[393) And as I have indicated and the Court has attempted to do, 
attempted to root the interpretation or analysis in those areas in history 
and tradition of this country, the liberty component of the due process 
clause, and I think that that is an appropriate restraint on judges. 
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Stevens: Originalism 
[ 42] And to the extent that open areas remain in our Constitution, 
and inevitably a large number do ... the judge, I think, has the duty, 
really, to do two things. One, to do his best to understand what was in-
tended in this kind of situation, and yet to realize that our society does 
change and to try to decide the case in a context that was not com-
pletely understood and envisioned by those who drafted the particular 
set of rules .... I think he has to be guided by history, by tradition, by 
his best understanding of what was intended by the Framers, and yet he 
also must understand that he is living in a different age in which some 
of the considerations that happen today must inevitably affect what he 
does. 
(44] [O]ne must study the document, the language used, and the 
intent of the Framers, and the way in which one thinks the Framers 
would have sized up the problem now presented. 
[72] And I think there is certainly some truth to the notion that 
one has to consider both the social conditions at the time the amend-
ment was adopted or the intent of the Framers and the background in 
which a particular punishment is being given out today. 
Rehnquist: Originalism 
[CJ-132] I think a judge has the obligation, when sitting in a Fed-
eral system like ours under a written Constitution, to attempt to use 
every bit of information and every method he can in order to find out 
what the Constitution means. Certainly a large part of this is the writ-
ten word that the Framers used, not the undisclosed intentions of the 
Framers, but the words that they used. 
[CJ-279] Well, there are a number of provisions in the Constitu-
tion that are sufficiently general so that they have application far be-
yond what the Framers, the people who ratified the Constitution, had 
before them at the time. In 1787, there was not a steamboat, there was 
not a railroad, there was not an airplane; yet they gave Congress no 
power over buggies or over post roads; they said Congress shall have 
the power to regulate commerce among the several States. And that 
provision is obviously broad enough to embrace any number of things 
that have come after. ... The fact that there were not any public 
schools in 1787 does not mean that those clauses of broad general ap-
plicability would not have application where appropriate to institutions 
that have come after the Framers. 
[AJ-55] My notion would be that one attempts to ascertain a con-
stitutional meaning ... by use of the language used by the Framers, the 
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historical materials available, and the precedents which other Justices 
of the Supreme Court have decided in cases involving a particular pro-
VISIOn. 
[AJ-81] Well, I think the Framers drafted a document. .. which 
was capable of forming a framework of government, not just in 1789, 
but in our own day. And there is no question in my mind that the prin-
ciples laid down then, as subsequently interpreted, must be applied to 
very changed conditions which occur now rather than then. But, I think 
even now it is to the Constitution and to its authentic interpretation 
that we must turn in solving constitutional problems, rather than to 
simply an outside desire to be "in step with the time." 
[AJ-138] I think that in interpreting the Constitution, one goes 
first to the document itself, to the historical materials that may be 
available, casting light on what the Framers may have intended, and to 
the decisions made by the Supreme Court construing it. 
O'Connor: Originalism 
[67] I do not believe that it is the function of the judiciary to step 
in and change the law because the times have changes or the social mo-
res have changed ... I believe that on occasion the Court has reached 
changed results interpreting a given provision of the Constitution based 
on its research of what the true meaning of the provision is- based on 
the intent of the Framers, its research on the history of that particular 
provision. I was not intending to suggest that those changes were being 
made because some other branch had failed to make the change as a 
matter of social policy. 
[84] Obviously the Constitution is the basic document to which 
the Justices must refer in rendering decisions on constitutional law. In 
analyzing a question of intent of the Framers of that document is vitally 
important. 
[102] I think there was an element indeed of the examination of 
the intent of the drafters of the [14th] amendment. I am sure that par-
ticular case [Brown] was impacted also by perceptions of the social im-
pacts the that particular instance. What I was trying to say was that in 
some cases in which our Court has reached a contrary result after a pe-
riod of years to a previous decision they do so occasionally based on a 
reexamination of the legislative history and of the intent of the Framers 
in an effort to determine whether the prior determination was correct. 
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Scalia: Originalism 
[37] Let us assume that somebody runs in from Princeton Univer-
sity, and on the basis of the latest historical research, he or she has dis-
covered a lost document which shows that it was never intended that 
the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare a statute un-
constitutional. I would not necessarily reverse Marbury v. Madison on 
the basis of something like that. To some extent, Government even at 
the Supreme Court level is a practical exercise. There are some things 
that are done, and when they are done, they are done and you move 
on. 
[48] I cannot say that I have a fully framed omnibus view of the 
Constitution. Now there are those who do have written pieces on con-
stitutional interpretation, and here is the matrix, and here is how you 
do it. I think it is fair to say you would not regard me as someone who 
would be likely to use the phrase, living Constitution. On the other 
hand, I am not sure you can say, he is pure and simply an original 
meaning .... What I think is that the Constitution is obviously not 
meant to be evolvable so easily that in effect a court of nine judges can 
treat it as though it is a bring-along-with-me statute and fill it up with 
whatever content the current times seem to require. To a large degree, 
it is intended to be an insulation against the current times, against the 
passions of the moment that may cause individual liberties to be disre-
garded, and it has served that function valuably very often. So I would 
never use the phrase, living Constitution. Now, there is within that 
phrase, however, the notion that a certain amount of development of 
constitutional doctrine occurs, and I think there is room for that. I 
frankly- the strict original intentist, I think would say that even such a 
clause as the cruel and unusual punishment clause would have to mean 
precisely the same thing today that it meant in 1789 ... so that if lash-
ing was fine then, lashing would be fine now. I am not sure I agree with 
that. I think that there are some provisions of the Constitution that 
may have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them. I have 
never been-what should I say-as I said earlier, I have not developed 
a full constitutional matrix. You are right though, in suspecting me to 
be more inclined to the original meaning that I am to a phrase like "liv-
ing Constitution." 
[88-89] Q: [T]he Supreme Court throughout history has had the 
responsibility to declare that certain widely accepted practices violate 
the Constitution-for example, deciding that segregated schools were 
unconstitutional, and that legislative districts had to be apportioned 
fairly. Are you saying that as a Supreme Court Justice, you would op-
pose decisions which prohibited widely accepted practice? A: There is 
an ongoing debate that has always been ongoing, but it is more publicly 
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known now, about strict constructionism verses a more evolutionary 
theory of the Constitution. And I am speaking particularly about deci-
sions of the court that give content to provisions of the Constitution 
that are not sufficiently explicit to strike down particular practices. If a 
practice that constitutes plainly racial discrimination existed in all the 
States, it would make no difference whether it existed from the begin-
ning of the 14th Amendment down to the present. If it is facially con-
trary to the language, obviously, there is no problem ... [J]udges have 
authority to give such content, no doubt, but I do not know how a 
judge intuits that a particular practice is contrary to our most funda-
mental beliefs, to the most fundamental beliefs of our society, when it 
is one that was in existence when the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was adopted and is still in existence .... I would find it very diffi-
cult ... to strike down a provision on the basis of substantive due proc-
ess ... where it is a provision that State legislatures generally adopted 
at the time the 14th amendment was passed and continue to generally 
adopt. ... I am not comfortable with imposing my moral views on so-
ciety. I need something to look to. And what I look to is the under-
standing of the people. A strict constructionist would say use only the 
understanding at the time of the 14th Amendment. The evolutionist 
would say no, the understanding today as well. Whichever of those two 
you use-and as I said in some earlier questioning, I am a little wishy-
washy on that point- but whichever of the two you use, it seems to me 
that either one or the other has to reflect the new right you have found. 
[104] But, as I've said, some cases that are so old, even if you 
waived in my face a document proving that they were wrong when de-
cided in 1803, I think you'd have to say, sorry, too late. 
[108] Q: What is your approach to [original intent]? A: Well, it is 
where I start from, Senator. I think the first step is to-and I use the 
term "original meaning" rather than "original intent," which is maybe 
something of a quibble, but I think that one is bound by the meaning of 
the Constitution to the society to which it was promulgated. And if 
somebody should discover that the secret intent of the Framers was 
quite different from what the words seem to connote, it would not 
make any difference. In any case, I start from the original meaning, and 
I think there is room for dispute as to what extent some of those ele-
ments of meaning are evolvable, such as the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. The starting point, in any case, is the text of the document 
and what it meant to the society that adopted it. I think it is part of my 
whole philosophy, which is essentially a democratic philosophy that 
even the Constitution is, at bottom ... a democratic document. It was 
adopted by the people's acceptance of it, by their voting for it, and its 
legitimacy depends upon democratic adoption at the time it was en-
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acted. Now, some of its provisions may have envisioned varying appli-
cation with varying circumstances. That is a subject of some dispute 
and a point on which I am quite wishy-washy. But I am clear on the 
fact that the original meaning is the starting point and the beginning of 
wisdom. 
Ginsburg: Originalism 
[118) I think the Framers are shortchanged if we view them as 
having a limited view of rights, because they wrote, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unal-
ienable rights, that among these" -among these- "are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness," and that government is formed to protect 
and secure these rights. 
[119) Now, it is true-and it is a point I made in the Madison Lec-
ture-that the immediate implementation in the days of the Founding 
Fathers in many respects was limited. "We the people" was not then 
what it is today. The most eloquent speaker on that subject was Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, during the series of bicentennial celebrations, 
when songs in full praise of the Constitution were sung. Justice Mar-
shall reminded us that the Constitution's immediate implementation, 
even its text, had certain limitations, blind spots, blots on our record. 
But he said that the beauty of this Constitution is that, through a com-
bination of judicial interpretation, constitutional amendment, laws 
passed by Congress, "We the people" has grown ever larger. So now it 
includes people who were once held in bondage. It includes women 
who were left out of the political community at the start. I hope that 
begins to answer your question. The view of the Framers, their large 
view, I think was expansive. Their immediate view was tied to the cir-
cumstances in which they lived. 
[127) Q: What about this statement: The only legitimate way for a 
judge to go about defining the law is by attempting to discern what 
those who made the law intended. A: I think all people could agree 
with that. But as I tried to say in response to the chairman's question, 
trying to divine what the Framers intended, I must look at that matter 
two ways. One is what they might have intended immediately for their 
day, and the other is their larger expectation that the Constitution 
would govern, as Cardozo said, not for the passing hour, but for the 
expanding future. And I know of no better illustration of that than to 
take the words of the great man who wrote the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Thomas Jefferson said: Were our state a pure democracy, 
there would still be excluded from our deliberations women who, to 
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prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix 
promiscuously in gatherings of men." Nonetheless, I do believe that 
Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would say that women are 
equal citizens .... So I see an immediate intent about how an ideal is 
going to be recognized at a given time and place, but also a larger aspi-
ration as our society improves. I think the Framers were intending to 
create a more perfect union that would become ever more perfect over 
time. 
[127-128] The judge has a law-whether it is a statute that Congress 
passed or our highest law, the Constitution-to construe, to interpret, 
and must try to be faithful to the provision. But it is no secret that some 
of these provisions are not self-defining. There is nothing a judge 
would like better than to be able to look at a text and say this text is 
clear and certain, I do not have to go beyond it to comprehend its 
meaning. But often that is not the case, and then a judge must do more 
than just read the specific words. The judges will read on to see what 
else is in the law and read back to see what was there earlier. The judge 
will look at precedent, to see how the words in this provision or in simi-
lar provisions have been construed. The effort is always to relate to the 
intent of the lawgiver or the lawmaker, but sometimes that intent is ob-
scure. 
[189] It is part of our history-a sad part of our history, Sena-
tor ... , but undeniably part of our history-that the 14th amendment, 
that great amendment that changed so much in this Nation, was not in-
tended by its Framers immediately to change the status of women .... 
Times changed, and eventually, after nearly a century of struggle, 
women achieved the vote. They became full citizens. And many people 
thought that when women became full citizens, entitled to the vote, 
they had achieved equality. The vote should have qualified women as 
full and equal citizens with men, entitled to the same equal protection 
before the laws. [Y]es, it took bold and dynamic interpretation in view 
of what the Framers of the 14th Amendment intended. The Framers of 
the 14th amendment meant no change, they intended no change at all 
in the status of women before the law. But in 1920, when women 
achieved the vote, they became full citizens, and you have to read the 
Constitution as a whole, changed, as Thurgood Marshall said, over the 
years by amendment and by judicial construction. 
[221] The point was that, at last, the country had come to appreci-
ate that women were full and equal citizens with men; that the percep-
tion of women's place that marked the 19th century and the 18th cen-
tury had become obsolete; that when the 19th amendment gave women 
the right to vote, they become full and equal citizens entitled to the 
same protection mean had under the 14th amendment. 
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[239] Q: [D]oes the nominee wish to interpret the Constitution as 
a static document, or ... wish the Court to initiate creative changes or 
creative new approaches? A: I have said that I associate myself with 
Justice Cardozo who said our Constitution was made not for the pass-
ing hour but for the expanding future. I believe that is what the Found-
ing Fathers intended. 
[303] I also said what a judge should take account of is not the 
weather of the day, but the climate of an era. The climate of the age, 
yes, but not the weather of the day, not what the newspaper is report-
mg. 
Souter: Originalism 
[128-129] I have tended to shy away from the use of the term 
""original intent" in describing any approach of mine. I have done so, 
because the phrase "original intent" has frequently been used to mean 
that the meaning or the application of a constitutional provision should 
be confined only to those specific examples that were intended to be 
the objects of its application when it was, in fact, adopted .... I do not 
believe that the appropriate criterion of constitutional meaning is this 
sense of specific intent, that you may never apply a provision to any 
subject except the subject specifically intended by the people who 
adopted it. ... If you were to confine the equal protection clause only 
to those subjects which its Framers and its adopters intended it to apply 
to, it could not have been applied to school desegregation .... The rea-
son Brown was correctly decided is not because they intended to apply 
the equal protection clause to school desegregation, but because they 
did not confine the equal protection clause to those specific or a spe-
cifically enumerated list of applications, the equal protection clause is, 
by its very terms, a clause of general application. What we are looking 
for, then, when we look for its original meaning is the principle that 
was intended to be applied, and if that principle is broad enough to ap-
ply to school desegregation, as it clearly was, then that was an appro-
priate application for it and Brown was undoubtedly correctly decided. 
[161-162] [T]he interpretive position that I start with when I am 
looking at a provision which has not been construed is one of original 
meaning, and in my discussion yesterday I distinguished that from the 
theory that would confine that meaning to those applications which 
were originally and specifically intended by the Framers or by the 
adopters of that provision to be its application .... But my interpretive 
position is not one that original intent is controlling, but that original 
meaning is controlling ..... [T]he ultimate criterion of meaning for 
me ... [is] not specific intent, but the principle intended. 
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[231-232] [I]n dealing with the question of what enumerated rights 
may be regarded as fundamental and what require a lesser standard of 
scrutiny, the courts from time to time have tried different tests .... I 
think I indicated my own view of the best approach to these problems 
is the one which is probably best identified with the late Justice Harlan. 
Justice Harlan said that we cannot approach these questions of weigh-
ing the value of asserted rights without an inquiry into the history and 
traditions of the American people, in order to try to find on a histori-
cally demonstrable basis their commitment to a set of values which ei-
ther do or do not support the claim that a particular right in question is 
fundamental. 
[235] My approach to interpretation is not a specific intent ap-
proach. The approach has got to take into consideration the text of the 
provisions in question and it is not to be confined, the meaning of that 
text is not to be confined by reference simply to the specific applica-
tions that may have been, as it were, in the mind either individually or 
institutionally of the people who proposed the amendment. We are 
looking, when we look for original meaning, we are looking for mean-
ing and for principle. We are not confining ourselves simply to imme-
diately intended application. 
[266] Q: Now, let us assume for a moment that this original intent 
school of thought is historically correct- that, as many argue very 
strongly, the Framers did have a very narrow view of the establishment 
clause-would this lead you to modify the principle of neutrality that 
has been accepted by the Supreme Court for decades? A: It would lead 
me to raise the question but it would not give me the answer. There are 
basically two other considerations. The first in this, as in any such case, 
is the claim of precedent. The second consideration which may fall, to a 
degree, under the claim of precedent, which is, at least. I think worth 
stating, stating separately, is whether, in fact, assuming that was the 
view of the Framers, the best way to affect it today is the way that the 
Court has, in fact, already taken. So that I do not regard the issue in 
this or in any other case as simply being a simple issue of what exactly 
was the original understanding because we are not being asked to ad-
judicate on a clean slate. 
[267] [L]et's assume that we found that the establishment clause 
had a very narrow intended meaning. Do we ignore, essentially, the 
development of the law for the last 40 [years] ... Or the last 200 years? 
The answer is, no, we don't deal with constitutional problems that way. 
[277] In the search for a content to the concept of privacy, we are 
not really looking for something new, as opposed to something which 
the constitutions assumed. We are looking for the principle that was 
intended to be recognized. The material on which we are going to base 
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our conclusions is basically the corpus of material that we regard as re-
liable evidence about the understanding of the limits of State or, in ap-
propriate cases, national power. Those limits in those materials include 
everything from things like Federalist Papers, debates, philosophical 
treatises of the times in question, which reflected a concept of limited 
power, and we certainly do not ignore the precedents of the Court that 
over the years have tried to treat with the subject. 
[303] I mentioned that when I speak of original intent, or the in-
tentionalist school, I am talking particularly about that view that the 
meaning of the provision or the application of the provision should 
somehow be confined to those specific instances or the provision 
should somehow be confined to those specific instances or problems 
which were in the minds of those who adopted and ratified the provi-
sion, and that the provision should be applied only to those instances or 
problems. I do not accept that view .... Principles don't change, but 
our perceptions of the world around us and the need for those princi-
ples do. 
Thomas: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[135] I think overruling a case or reconsidering a case, Senator, is 
a very serious matter. Certainly, the case would have to be-you would 
have to be of the view that a case is incorrectly decided, but I think 
even that is not adequate. There are some cases that you may not agree 
with that should not be overruled. Stare decisis provides continuity to 
our system, it provides predictability, and in our process of case-by-
case decision making, I think it is a very important and critical concept, 
and I think that a judge has the burden. A judge that wants to recon-
sider a case and certainly one who wants to overrule a case has the 
burden of demonstrating that not only is the case indirect, but that it 
would be appropriate, in view of stare decisis, to make that additional 
step of overruling that case. 
[246] I think that the principle of stare decisis, the concept of stare 
decisis, is an important link in our system of deciding cases in our sys-
tem of judicial jurisprudence. The reason I think it is important is this: 
we have got to have continuity if there is going to be any reliance, if 
there is going to be any chain in our case law. I think that the first point 
in any revisiting of the case is that the case be wrongly decided, that 
one thing it is incorrect. But more than that is necessary before one can 
rethink it or attempt to reconsider it. And I think that the burden is on 
the individual or on the judge or the Justice who thinks that a prece-
dent should be overruled to demonstrate more than its mere incorrect-
ness. And at least one factor that would weigh against overruling a 
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precedent would be the development of institutions as a result of a 
prior precedent having been in place. But, again, I think the first step is 
that the precedent be incorrect, and the second step in the analysis has 
to be more than the mere incorrectness of that precedent. 
[339] In the statutory area of law, in the case law involving stat-
utes, there seems to be less of an inclination on the part of judges tore-
consider or overrule cases, primarily because of the view or the feeling 
that if it were wrong to begin with, then the legislature would have cor-
rected it, and I think that sort of underscores the point that Senator [X] 
was making yesterday about revisiting statutory interpretation cases or 
precedent. In the area of constitutional cases or constitutional law 
cases, at least those cases are very, very, important, but the feeling is or 
the sentiment is on the part of the court that those cases can only be 
revisited in a realistic way by the judiciary, since the amendment proc-
ess is one that is very remote, as far as the possibility of occurring, and 
that those cases are more likely to be revisited or reconsidered. Again, 
I don't think there is precise calculus in approaching those two areas. I 
do think that you start with the case being wrong, one has to view that 
case as wrong, and I think one has to understand and take into account 
the continuity in our legal system, and has to understand or I think 
demonstrate why this continuity should in some way be broken. I don't 
think that is necessarily an easy task, and it is certainly one that should 
be considered with a high level of seriousness and high level of concern 
about what the judge is doing, even if the case is found to be wrong. 
[420] Senator, I think it is important for any judge to take into ac-
count, even when he or she disagrees with a particular case, to recog-
nize that there is the additional burden and additional question of 
whether or not this case should be overruled; that is a question about 
the doctrine of stare decisis. I do not think that judges should assume, 
simply because they disagree with a particular case, that we are operat-
ing as though there was no prior case law or there are no precedents 
and feel free to act as though they are not in any way controlled or re-
strained or constrained by prior case law. My sentiments, without ex-
pressing a particular judgment on that case, my sentiments would be 
toward a preferences for recognizing that there is a significant weight 
to be given to existing case law and that the burden is on the judge who 
wants to change that precedent, to not only show why it is wrong, but 
why stare decisis should not apply. 
Kennedy: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[135] In any case, Senator, the role of the judge is to approach the 
subject with an open mind, to listen to the counsel, to look at the facts 
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of the particular case, to see what the injury is, see what the hurt is, to 
see what the claim is, and then to listen to his or her colleagues, and 
then to research the law. What does the most recent precedent, the 
precedent that is before the Court if it is being examined for a possible 
overruling, and what does that precedent say? What is its logic? What 
is its reasoning? What has been its acceptance by the lower courts? Has 
the rule proven to be workable? Does the rule fit with what the judge 
deems to be the purpose of the Constitution as we have understood it 
over the last 200 years? History is tremendously important in this re-
gard. 
[135] Now, as you well appreciate, and as you certainly know, 
Senator, stare decisis is not an automatic mechanism. We do not just 
pull a stare decisis lever or not pull it in any particular case. Stare de-
cisis is really a description of the whole judicial process that proceeds 
on a case by case basis as judges slowly and deliberately decide the 
facts of a particular case, and hope their decision yields a general prin-
ciple that may be of assistance to themselves and to later courts. 
[136] Stare decisis ensures impartiality. That is one of its principle 
uses. It ensures that from case to case, from judge to judge, from age to 
age, the law will have a stability that the people can understand and 
rely upon. that judges can understand and rely upon, and that attorneys 
can understand and rely upon. That is a very, very important part of 
the system. 
[136] Now there have been discussions that stare decisis should 
not apply as rigidly in the constitutional area as in other areas. The ar-
gument for that is that there is no other overruling body in the constitu-
tional area. In a stare decisis problem involving a non-constitutional 
case, the Senate and the House of Representatives can tell us we are 
wrong by passing a bill. That cannot happen in the constitutional case. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that when judges have announced 
that a particular rule is found in the Constitution; it is entitled to very 
great weight. The court does two things: it interprets history and it 
makes history. It has got to keep those two roles separate. Stare decisis 
helps it to do that. 
[171] This is what stare decisis is all about. You look to see how 
the great Justices that have sat on the court for years have understood 
and interpreted the Constitution, and from that you get a sense of what 
the Constitution really means. An English representative in the House 
of Commons once said that "history is philosophy teaching by exam-
ple''; and I think that the law can be described the same way. 
[230] As you know, Senator, stare decisis has an element of cer-
tainty to it, which most Latin phrases do, but it really is a description of 
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the entire legal process. Stare decisis is the guarantee of impartiality. It 
is the basis upon which the case system proceeds, and without it we are 
simply going from day to day with no stability, with no contact with our 
past. And so stare decisis is very important, but, obviously, if a case is 
illogical, if it cannot be reconciled with all the parallel precedent, if it 
appears that it is simply out of accord with the purposes of the Consti-
tution, then it must be overruled. 
Breyer: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[192] I cannot say that precedent always answers the question, but 
it is terribly important to refer to the precedent, and the opinion grows 
out of prior precedent. That is normal. 
[291] My view is that stare decisis is very important to the law. 
Obviously, you can't have a legal system that doesn't operate with a lot 
of weight given to stare decisis, because people build their lives, they 
build their lives on what they believe to be the law. And insofar as you 
begin to start overturning things, you upset the lives of men, women, 
children, people all of the country. So be careful, because people can 
adjust, and even when something is wrong, they can adjust to it. And 
once they have adjusted, be careful of fooling with their expectation. 
[291] [I]t seems to me that there are identifiable factors that are 
pretty well established. If you, as a judge, are thinking of overturning 
or voting to overturn a preexisting case, what you do is ask a number of 
fairly specific questions. How wrong do you think that prior precedent 
really was as a matter of law, that is, how badly reasoned was it? You 
ask yourself how the law has changed since, all the adjacent laws, all 
the adjacent rules and regulations, does it no longer fit. You ask your-
self how have the facts changed, has the world changed in very impor-
tant ways. You ask yourself, insofar, irrespective of how wrong that 
prior decision was as a matter of reasoning, how has it worked out in 
practice, has it proved impossible or very difficult to administer, has it 
really confused matters. Finally, you look to the degree of reliance that 
people have had in their ordinary lives on that previous precedent. 
[291] Those [the above considerations] are the kinds of questions 
you ask. I think you ask those questions in relation to statues. I think 
you ask those questions in relation to the Constitution. The real differ-
ence between the two areas is that Congress can correct a constitu-
tional court, if it is a a statutory question, but it can't make a correc-
tion, if it is a constitutional matter. So be pretty careful. 
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Rehnquist: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
(CJ-227] Q: Do you believe that it is your responsibility to keep 
voicing your view on an issue even if stare decisis leads the Court to 
decide a specific case in another way? A: I think generally, yes, Sena-
tor, that if one sees a constitutional case issue a particular way and 
simply is not persuaded, that in most cases it is a part of function of a 
judge to say something in dissent. I think on statutory cases, it may be 
somewhat different. The ballgame is over when the Supreme Court de-
cides a statutory case. Congress can change the result if they do not like 
it. And I think there, a dissent, particularly a sole dissent, has a good 
deal less to be said for it. 
[CJ-270] Stare decisis is the principle, of course, that. .. once the 
Supreme Court has decided a case, that that decision settles the law for 
the future. And I think ... when you are looking at a statutory ques-
tion- that is, let us suppose that in 1950, the Supreme Court has said 
that a particular Act of Congress means thus-and-so, and now ... 
someone is coming back and saying, "Well, the Court was wrong in 
1950. If you really look at the legislative history and construe the words 
the way they ought to be construed, it did not mean thus-and-so." I 
think every responsible judge would reject that sort of an attack, except 
under the most extraordinary situation, because when you are talking 
about a statute, Congress can change the result if it does not like the 
conclusion the court reaches. If you turn to a similar constitutional 
question that perhaps was decided in 1950, and now you are urged to 
reverse it and overturn it. .. , there is more flexibility, more play in the 
joints, but still a very strong presumption in favor of the earlier deci-
sion, it seems to me. But nonetheless, the stare decisis principle has a 
more flexible application when you are talking about constitutional de-
cisions than when you are talking about simple statutory decisions. 
(AJ-19] I feel that great weight should be given to precedent. I 
think the Supreme Court has said many times that it is perhaps entitled 
to perhaps somewhat less weight in the field of constitutional law than 
it is in other areas of the law. But, nonetheless, I believe great weight 
should be given to it. I think that the fact that the Court was unanimous 
in handing down a precedent makes a precedent stronger than if a 
court was 5 to 4 in handing down the precedent. And I think the fact 
that a precedent has stood for a very long time, or has been reexam-
ined by a succeeding number of judges, gives it added weight. 
[ AJ -55] (T]o the extent that a precedent is not that authoritative 
in the sense of having stood for a shorter period of time, or having been 
handed down by a sharply divided court, then it is of less weight as a 
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precedent. This is not to say that there is not a presumption in favor of 
precedent in every instance. 
[AJ-138] I think it is important in constitutional law although I 
think traditionally it is regarded as less binding in the area of constitu-
tional law than it is, for example, in the area of statutory construction. I 
think it is nonetheless important and an important factor to be consid-
ered because basically it represents the judgment of what nine other 
Justices who took the oath of office to faithfully administer the Consti-
tution thought it meant on the facts before them then. And I think any 
decision rendered in that matter is entitled to great weight by a subse-
quent Court in considering the same question. 
[AJ-168] I think one would approach a unanimous decision, par-
ticularly one that has been reexamined and reaffirmed, with the great-
est deference. That doesn't say you never decide otherwise. 
[AJ-168] Again, an 8-to-1 decision is not one lightly to be disre-
garded, but nonetheless, if upon reexamination giving the weight that 
you ought to give to a precedent it appears wrong, then it is wrong. 
Stevens: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[40] I think there would be times when the Court might be called 
upon to reexamine earlier decisions which might have been incorrectly 
decided. But I think it is still an important value and perhaps particu-
larly so at the national level because there is so much more reliance on 
past decisions in the Federal system when it is a decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. ... [T]here is important value in a system of law which 
is largely developed on a case-by-case basis to give appropriate respect 
to that which has been decided before, but yet there are occasions 
when the desirability of certainty and predictability is outweighed by 
other factors. 
[40] I would say that I certainly would weigh very carefully any 
decision that had already been reached by a prior Court and I would be 
most reluctant to depart from prior precedent without a clear showing 
that departure was warranted. I would feel bound, but not absolutely 
100-percent bound; I think I could not, in good conscience, say that. I 
think there are occasions, particularly in constitutional adjudication, 
where it is necessary to recognize that a prior decision may have been 
erroneous and should be reexamined. 
[41] [I]t is my understanding that decisions that appeared to be 
unanimous in prior years were not, in fact, always so. There are private 
papers of some of the Justices that indicate that it was more customary 
then than it has been in recent years for Justices to go along with the 
majority opinion rather than to voice dissent. So sometimes the unani-
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mous opinion is somewhat deceptive and I think one has to be a little 
bit careful about overstating reliance on the factor of unanimity. But I 
would agree that to the extent that the decision was unanimous rather 
than closely divided you would tend to give more respect to it and feel 
more comfortable in figuring that it really did command a unanimous 
view. And also I think in the 5-to-4 decisions usually the countervailing 
argument is spelled out in some detail so you have, right on the face of 
the decision, reasons to consider the opposite conclusion as well. 
O'Connor: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[83] Stare decisis of course is a crucial question with respect to any 
discussion of the Supreme Court and its work. I think most people 
would agree that stability of the law and predictability of the law arc 
vitally important concepts. Justice Cardozo pointed out the chaos that 
would result if we decided every case on a case-by-case basis without 
regard to precedent . It would make administration of justice virtually 
impossible. Therefore, it plays a very significant role in our legal sys-
tem. We are guided, indeed. at the Supreme Court level and in other 
courts by the concept that we will follow previously decided cases 
which are in point. Now at the level of the Supreme Court where we 
are dealing with a matter of constitutional law as opposed to a matter 
of interpretation of congressional statute, there has been some sugges-
tion made that the role of stare decisis is a little bit different in the 
sense that if the Court is deciding a case concerning the interpretation, 
for example, of a congressional act and the Court renders a decision, 
and if Congress feels that decision was wrong, then Congress itself can 
enact further amendments to make adjustments. Therefore, we are not 
without remedies in that situation. Whereas, if what the Court decided 
is a matter of constitutional interpretation and that is the last word, 
then the only remedy, as you have already indicated, is either for an 
amendment to the Constitution to be offered or for the Court itself to 
either distinguish its holdings or somehow change them. We have seen 
this process occur throughout the Court's history. There are instances 
in which the Justices of the Supreme Court have decided after examin-
ing a problem or a given situation that their previous decision or the 
previous decisions of the Court in that particular matter were based on 
faulty reasoning or faulty analysis or otherwise a flawed interpretation 
of the law. In that instance they have the power, and indeed the obliga-
tion if they so believe, to overturn that previous decision and issue a 
decision that they feel correctly reflects the appropriate constitutional 
interpretation. What I am saying in effect is, it is not cast in stone but 
very important. 
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[84] I am sure that in each instance it is a very significant thing for 
a Justice to overturn precedent, particularly that of long standing. 
Scalia: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[32] The Supreme Court is bound to its earlier decisions by the 
doctrine of stare decisis in which I strongly believe. 
[37] Q: Well, what weight do you give the precedents of the Su-
preme Court? A: It depends upon the nature of the precedent, the na-
ture of the issue. Let us assume that somebody runs in from Princeton 
University, and on the basis of the latest historical research, he or she 
has discovered a lost document which shows that it was never intended 
that the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare a statute 
unconstitutional. I would not necessarily reverse Marbury v. Madison 
on the basis of something like that. To some extent, Government even 
at the Supreme Court level is a practical exercise. There are some 
things that are done, and when they are done, they are done and you 
move on. Now, which of those you think are so woven in the fabric of 
law that mistakes made are too late to correct, and which are not, that 
is a difficult question to answer. It can only be answered in the context 
of a particular case, and I do not think I should answer anything in the 
context of a particular case. 
[45] Q: [A Supreme Court Justice] said that a precedent might be 
less authoritative if it had stood for a shorter period of time or if it was 
a decision by a sharply divide court. ... Would you agree with that 
general sentiment? A: Well, I think the length of time is a considerably 
important factor. The Marbury v. Madison example that I gave in re-
sponse to [a previous question.] I am not sure that I agree with [the 
Justice] that the closeness of the prior decision makes that much differ-
ence. I mean, if Marbury v. Madison had been 5 to 4, I am not sure I 
would reverse it today. But I can understand how some judges might 
consider that that is an appropriate factor as well. I agree- I certainly 
agree with the former. The latter would not have occurred to me, but 
maybe. 
[104] I agree with the statement that longstanding cases are more 
difficult to overrule than recent cases .... [A ]s I've said, some cases 
that are so old, even if you waived a document in my face proving that 
they were wrong when decided in 1803, I think you'd have to say, sorry, 
too late. 
Ginsburg: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[197-198] The soundness of the reasoning is certainly a considera-
tion [in a sound theory of stare decisis]. But we shouldn't abandon a 
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precedent just because we think a different solution more rational. Jus-
tice Brandeis said some things are better settled than settled right, es-
pecially when the legislature sits. So if a precedent settles the construc-
tion of a statute, stare decisis means more than attachment to the 
soundness of the reasoning. Reliance interests are important; the stabil-
ity, certainty, predictability of the law is important. If people know 
what the law is, they can make their decisions, set their course in ac-
cordance with that law. So the importance of letting the matter stay de-
cided means judges should not discard precedent simply because they 
later conclude it would have been better to have decided the case the 
other way. That is not enough. If it is a decision that concerns the Con-
stitution ... then the Court knows the legislature, in many cases, can't 
come to the rescue. If the judges got it wrong, it may be that they must 
provide the correction. But even in constitutional adjudication, stare 
decisis is one of the restraints against a judge infusing his or her own 
values into the interpretation of the Constitution .... One of the things 
Brandeis said when he overruled Swift v. Tyson in Erie was that the 
Swift regime had proved unworkable. "Is it working" is a major consid-
eration regarding stare decisis. Reliance interests did not support re-
taining Swift because there was no stable law to rely on. What had 
been generated was confusion and uncertainty. Private actors didn't 
know whether the law governing their transaction would be the law as 
declared by the Federal court or the law declared by the State court, 
until they had a disagreement and litigation commenced. So how has a 
precedent worked in practice? What about reliance interests? Those 
things count, as well as the soundness of the decision. Stare decisis is 
also important because it keeps judges from infusing their own value 
judgments into the law. 
[198] Q: [For purposes of stare decisis, do] you have some feeling 
that criminal law ought to be put on the same par and on the same 
equal basis as commercial or property law? A: I don't think that reli-
ance is absent from the criminal law field. Recall that precedent is set 
for the way the courts will behave, the way the police will behave, the 
way prosecutors will behave. One can't say that, in criminal law, reli-
ance doesn't count. Adhering to precedent fosters the stability, the cer-
tainty, the clarity of the law; stare decisis across the board serves those 
purposes. We have distanced ourselves from the British practice which, 
until very recently, so solidly entrenched stare decisis that the House of 
Lords, the Law Lords, would not overrule any precedent. That rigidity 
became unworkable and the Law Lords admit some leeway. But stare 
decisis is a firm principle of our law and important in all areas. 
[317] I believe, too, that stare decisis has an important role to play 
in constitutional interpretation .... One doesn't lightly overrule prece-
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dent even in the constitutional area. But Brandeis made an obvious 
point, although he said it so well. Correction can come by legislation if 
the Court messes up on a matter of statutory interpretation. That often 
can't be done when the question is one of constitutional interpretation. 
[318] Yes, [time and acceptance are major factors to be consid-
ered before overturning a past decision]. How [has] it been working? 
What expectations, what reliance interests has the decision generated? 
Those are major factors. 
Souter: Stare Decisis/Precedent 
[67-68] [T]he doctrine of stare decisis which we speak of in that 
shorthand kind of way is a series of considerations which courts bear in 
mind in deciding whether a prior precedent should be followed or 
should not be. Some such doctrine or some such rule is a bedrock ne-
cessity if we are going to have in our judicial systems anything that can 
be called the rule of law as opposed simply to random decisions on a 
case-to-case basis. The problem that the doctrine of stare decisis ad-
dresses is the problem of trying to give a proper value to a given prece-
dent when someone asks a court to overrule it and to go another 
way .... 
The first thing, kind of the threshold question that, of course, you 
start with on any issue of precedent, is the question of whether the 
prior case was wrong. We don't raise precedential issues unless we are 
starting with the assumption that there is something inappropriate 
about the prior decision. Now, that decision may have been right at the 
time and there now be a claim that, in fact, it is wrong to be applied 
now. But the first question that we have to ask is: If we were deciding 
the case today, if we were living in a kind of Garden of Eden and we 
didn't have the precedent and this was the first case, would we decide it 
the same way? If the answer is no, we would not do so, then we look to 
a series of factors to try to decide how much value we ought to put on 
that precedent even though it is not one that we particularly like or 
would think appropriate in the first instance. One of the factors which 
is very important I will throw together under the term of reliance. Who 
has relied upon that precedent, and what does that reliance count for 
today? ... 
We ask in some context whether private citizens in their lives have 
relied upon it in their own planning to such a degree that, in fact, it 
would be a great hardship in overruling it now. We look to whether 
legislatures have relied upon it, in legislation which assumes the cor-
rectness of that precedent. We look to whether the court in question or 
other courts have relied upon it, in developing a body of doctrine. If a 
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precedent, in fact, is consistent with a line of development which ex-
tends from its date to the present time, then the cost of overruling that 
precedent is, of course, going to be enormously greater and enor-
mously different from what will be the case in instances in which the 
prior case either has not been followed or the prior case has simply 
been eroded, chipped away at, as we say, by later determinations. 
Beyond that, we look to such factors as the possibility of other 
means of overruling the precedent. There is some difference, although 
we may have trouble in weighting it, there is some difference between 
constitutional and statutory interpretation precedent, which Congress 
or a legislature can overrule, so we look to other possibilities. In all of 
these instances, we are trying to give a fair weight to the claim of that 
precedent to be followed today, even though in some respect we find it 
deficient on the merits. 
[133] If we are talking about a 5-to-4 decision that is 50 years old 
and has spawned a body of consistent, supporting precedent which is 
basically the foundation of the law that we have, the fact that it was 5 
to 4 originally is a matter of small or no consequence at all. If, on the 
other hand, we are talking about a 5-to-4 decision which was rendered 
the year before and in between there are arguably inconsistent prece-
dents with it, then, of course, you are not going to be able to give it that 
much weight. I suppose the real significance of its being 5 to 4 under 
those circumstances is that if it were unanimous it is virtually unlikely 
that there would be the arguably inconsistent precedents following it. 
So I just think the numbers analysis standing by itself is a misleading 
analysis. 
[142] [C]onstitutional precedent is always, in theory, subject tore-
examination. Our theory of precedent tries to give some indication of 
the force which a given precedent should have when reexamination is 
requested. 
[257] I accept as a general rule, just as you said, Senator, that 
statutory interpretations are entitled to the highest claim to be fol-
lowed for the very reason that as statutory interpretations, if there is 
anything wrong with them, legislatures-in this case, the Congress-
can take action to change them. 
[258] I do not accept the position that never under any circum-
stances can a statutory interpretation be reexamined. I think "never" is 
a pretty strong word. But there is very, very strong claim of precedent 
to be followed in those circumstances. 
[324] Q: Now, it is interesting that, in a matter of this sort, where 
[your court] in 1984 had overruled a decision of [your court] from 1980, 
and the case came up again in 1986, just 2 years later, and the court had 
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seemed perfectly willing to change back and forth, that you found it 
important to maintain the decision. Why? A: Because the case struck 
me as a classic example of the kind of case in which there has got to be 
an opportunity for reliance upon what the court does. We were dealing 
in that case with the issuance of insurance policies. We have obligations 
to both parties to those policies to come up with a coherent body of law 
which can be understood and which those parties can rely upon in mak-
ing their business arrangements. We simply cannot go back and forth in 
cases of that sort every couple of years, and therefore, I believed we 
were in a situation in which the demand for reasonable reliance cer-
tainly outweighed my concern to go back andsort of rewrite the his-
tory ... in the way that I would have done, if I had been able to that in 
the first place. 
Breyer: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[137) In respect to the constitutionality of the death penalty, it 
seems to me that the Supreme Court has considered that matter for 
quite a long time, in a large number of case. And indeed, if you look at 
those cases, you will see that the fact that there are some circumstances 
in which the death penalty is consistent with the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the Constitution is, in my opinion, settled law. At this 
point it is settled. 
[182) It [honesty in sentencing) is there; that is, the sentence given 
is the sentence served, and I think that that has helped in the Federal 
system; that is, I think people who understand the differences between 
the Federal and the State systems have begun to understand that the 
sentence that is given is the sentence that will be served, with very 
few-15 percent leeway. That has helped. 
[238) Insofar as you are suggesting that you have to remember 
that privacy is what Brandeis said is the most civil and the most impor-
tant right of civilized people, and so forth, is a right that really is pro-
tected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches, unrea-
sonable seizures. Insofar as you are suggesting beware of fixed rules 
interpreting that, because if you just follow fixed rules, you will dis-
cover that technology outdates the rules, and remember to protect the 
basic value which might be threatened by some kind of technology that 
we have not heard of, or that we have heard of but we didn't know 
could get that far. I agree with that. 
[239) Basically, we were in agreement about the rule of law that 
the police and right, even without a warrant, to go look for that gun, if 
they reasonably thought they were in danger. And the majority 
thought, no, no, they are not in danger, because, after all, this guy is 
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handcuffed to the bed. I thought, well, a handcuff, you know, a lot can 
happen. I mean, they might say, "I want to go to the bathroom" and 
they unlock it, he knows the gun is there, they do not, I don't know 
how strong the bed is, and so in my mind is that the police were rea-
sonable in thinking that there was a danger: and they knew there was a 
gun there and so thy ought to look for it. 
[256] [regarding the exclusionary rule] [T]he basic idea, of course 
is that it is very puzzling to people, very puzzling, what Cardozo said. 
He said, "well, why should the criminal go free, because the constable 
has blundered?" And the answer to that is, over the course of time and 
a long period of time, people learned that the protection in the fourth 
amendment, totally innocent people wouldn't be broken into in the 
middle of the night, that confessions wouldn't be extracted through vio-
lence, that the only way to make those meaningful in practice was to 
have this exclusionary rule. And it has become I think fairly widely ac-
cepted. The exact contours of it, and the shape and size and on the 
border how it should look, and so forth, I recognize, but that is a matter 
of considerable controversy and debate, and Congress or others might 
well criticize or want to do it this way or that way or the other way. 
[257] T]he great debate, as you recognize in this area, particularly 
with the death penalty, is involved, is habeas corpus tells us we don't 
want to have this or any person have a penalty particularly of this sort, 
if the trial was fundamentally unfair. Of course, people keep coming on 
again and again and they say, well, it was fundamentally unfair, and 
then the courts say no, it was OK, and then they have a new reason and 
a new reason and so the problem is this problem of delay. At the same 
time, people might sometimes come up with reasons that they for good 
cause couldn't present before. So I understand how you are trying to 
balance those two things, the need for fundamental fairness and the 
need to avoid unreasonable delay. 
[360] I think that if in fact I could have read the statute, "three 
prior convictions," to mean what you say-three prior convictions-the 
case would have been much easier. The problem in the case arose from 
the fact that you could not read it that way because the Supreme Court 
had said at least some of those things that say "convictions" are not 
convictions. They had said, for example, that one of those previous 
convictions was a conviction that was obtained without the person hav-
ing a lawyer: then, it is not a conviction, even though it says "convic-
tion." So the dilemma-and this why it was so very difficult-is it as-
sumed by everybody, everybody agrees, that you cannot just read 
"conviction'' to mean conviction. Certain ones do not count. Those 
without a lawyer, for example, do not count. And now the question is 
are there some other ones that do not count. And the simplest thing 
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seemed to me to be to say those that are unconstitutional do not count, 
because if you do not do it that way, you would have to say there are 
some unconstitutional convictions which are convictions, and there are 
other unconstitutional convictions-those without a lawyer-which are 
not convictions. And I did not understand how to draw that distinction. 
Kennedy: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[113] Well, Senator, I do not think that there is a choice between 
order and liberty. We can have both. Without ordered liberty, there is 
no liberty at all. One of the highest priorities of society is to protect it-
self against the corruption and the corrosiveness and the violence of 
crime. In my view judges must not shrink from enforcing the laws 
strictly and fairly in the criminal area. They should not have an identity 
crisis or self-doubts when they have to impose a severe sentence. It is 
true that we have a system in this country of policing the police. We 
have a system in this country that requires courts to reverse criminal 
convictions when the defendant is guilty. We have a system in this 
country under which relevant, essential, necessary, probative, convinc-
ing evidence is not admitted in the court because it was improperly 
seized. This illustrates, I suppose, that constitutional rights are not 
cheap. Many good things in life are not cheap and constitutional rights 
are one of them. We pay a price for constitutional rights. My view of 
interpreting these rules is that they should be pragmatic. They should 
be workable. 
[113] We have paid a very heavy cost to educate judges and police 
officers throughout this country, and the criminal system works much 
better than many people give it credit for. ... On the other hand, it is 
sometimes frustrating for the courts, as it is frustrating for all of us, to 
enforce a rule in a hyper-technical way when the police or the prosecu-
tor have made a mistake in good faith. The good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule is one of the Court's recent pronouncements to try to 
meet some of these concerns. It remains to be seen how workable that 
exception is. 
[136] I would like to underscore that I have not committed myself 
as to the constitutionality of the death penalty. I have stated that if it is 
found to be constitutional, it should be enforced. 
[204] The purposes [of the exclusionary rule] are in the nature of a 
deterrent. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to advise law en-
forcement officers in advance that if they do not follow the rules of the 
fourth amendment, the evidence they seize is not going to be usable. 
Now, if the rule goes beyond that point, and a police officer in all good 
faith, after studying the rule, makes a snap decision that a warrant is 
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valid. or a considered decision that a warrant is valid, then I think the 
system out to give some recognition to that reasonable exercise of 
judgment on his part. 
[205] The Miranda rule, it seems to me, again, we have paid the 
major cost by installing it. We have now educated law enforcement of-
ficers and prosecutors all over the country, and it has become almost 
part of the criminal justice folklore .... Well, I think that since it is es-
tablished, it is entitled to great respect. 
[205] Well, the Miranda rule, as I said, is in place. It was a sweep-
ing, sweeping rule. It wrought almost a revolution. It is not clear to me 
that it necessarily followed from the words of the Constitution. Yet it is 
in place now, and I think it is entitled to great respect. ... I think 
[Miranda] went to the verge of the law. 
[220] I have indicated that the decisions of the Warren Court went 
to the very verge of the law at least. We are talking about criminal pro-
cedure cases, the ones we have mentioned. That we have paid a heavy 
cost for imposing those rules on the criminal system; that they seem to 
be part of our constitutional system now; and that I think a very strong 
argument would have to be mounted in order to withdraw those deci-
sions. I do think the decisions have evinced on an explicit basis, the fact 
that they involve pragmatic, preventative rules announced by the 
Court, and the Court itself has admitted that they are not necessarily 
demanded by the Constitution. 
[233] WelL I guess we disagree on whether [the constitutionality 
of the death penalty] is well settled. These decisions are very close .... 
I have indicated that in my view, if [the death penalty] is held constitu-
tional it should be swiftly and efficiently enforced. I recognize also that 
capital punishment is recognized in the Constitution, in the 5th 
amendment. 
Thomas: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[133] The death penalty is the harshest penalty that can be im-
posed, and it is certainly one that is unchangeable. And we should be 
most concerned about providing all the rights and all the due process 
that can be provided and should be provided to individuals who may 
face that kind of a consequence. I would be concerned, of course, that 
we would move too fast, that if we eliminate some of the protections 
that perhaps we may deprive that individual of his life without due 
process. So I would be in favor of reasonable restrictions on proce-
dures, but not to the point that individuals-or I believe that there 
should be reasonable restrictions at some point, but not the point that 
an individual is deprived of his constitutional protections. 
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[133] Of course, we would like to make sure that the victims [of 
crimes] are involved in the process, but we should be very careful, in 
my view, that we don't somehow undermine the validity of the process; 
that an individual who is a criminal defendant is in some way harmed 
by that other than just simply getting it right and making sure that the 
total impact of the conduct is known. I think that there are concerns on 
both sides. From the standpoint of the victims, that is important. But 
there are also the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant. 
[135] I think that the court and the law enforcement community 
have come to accept the use of the exclusionary rule up to a point, and 
the court is looking for ways to make sure that the purposes of the ex-
clusionary rule are advanced, as opposed to simply being used in a way 
that is rote. 
[423] Philosophically, Senator, there is nothing that would bother 
me personally about upholding [the death penalty] in appropriate 
cases. My concern, of course, would always be that we provide all of 
the available protections and accord all of the protections available to a 
criminal defendant who is exposed to or sentenced to the death pen-
alty. 
Rehnquist: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[ CJ -211] [T]he constitutional rights of the defendants are essential 
and vital. But they also stand against the right of society and limit the 
right of society, in the traditional view of criminal law, to apprehend 
the guilt and exonerate the innocent. And obviously, it was intended 
that the Bill of Rights have this restrictive function, but I have ex-
pressed the view in my opinions that this endless expansion of constitu-
tional rights for defendants by judicial construction is not a welcomed 
thing because it does tend to impair in a way that the Constitution did 
not intend to have it impaired, the right of society to fairly and justly 
administer criminal law, with proper respect not just for the defendant, 
but for the victim and for the social interest in seeing the law enforced. 
[ AJ-43] I made the statement saying that the abandonment of the 
field arrest procedures and the consequent, or perhaps not necessarily 
consequent, delay in bringing the defendants before an arresting magis-
trate, or a committing magistrate, was, I thought, defensible because 
the requirements that a defendant be brought before a magistrate were 
that he be brought before the magistrate within a reasonable time, and 
that in my opinion a reasonable time in this situation should take into 
consideration the necessity of the arresting officer, having made the ar-
rest, continuing to be in the field to prevent the occurrence of other 
violence. 
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[AJ-44] I do not think arresting without probable cause is ever 
proper. .. 
[AJ-44] It suggests to me that whereas there may have been 
probably cause for the arrest of the great number of people, the ... po-
lice were faced with such as overwhelming situation of violation of law 
that they chose to try to keep the streets free, and rather than to pre-
serve the necessary information that would enable them to later show 
either that there had been probable cause for an arrest, or probable 
cause to bind a man over. 
[ AJ-45] I think the one thing that happened was that the number 
of people who were involved ... was an overwhelmingly large num-
ber. ... As a result, they were faced with a choice of either, when an 
individual policeman arrested a law violator, or someone he thought 
was a law violator, of himself taking that man to a stationhouse, book-
ing him, and going through the usual procedures, or simply having the 
man taken in some other manner to the stationhouse. And the police-
man then would stay on the streets to try to arrest the next bunch who 
were coming along. And as I understand it, they were very deliberately 
trying to obstruct the movement of traffic, frequently by hazardous 
means. I think the ... police opted in favor of the latter choice, and I 
cannot find it in myself to fault them for it. 
[AJ-67] I think, from the law enforcement point of view, we were 
skeptical of the notion that some sort of judicial hearing should be re-
quired before an investigation be even undertaken which, I think, 
would have the most deleterious effect on effective law enforcement, in 
effect, preventing the commencement of an investigation which might 
ultimately end up in a showing of probable cause before the investiga-
tion could even start. 
[AJ-139] Senator, I have made public statements ... in support of 
the constitutionality of pretrial detention .... 
Stevens: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[56] I also place an extremely high value on the interests protected 
by the due process clause insofar as it guarantees fair procedure to 
every defendant. 
[75] I have had occasion to write at least one opinion in what was 
a rather severe attempt by the prosecutor to make use of information 
in an arrest, or maybe he was trying to use a misdemeanor, for im-
peachment purposes which we thought was clearly improper, and I 
have also written an opinion on the subject to the extent to which a 
prior conviction is properly used for impeachment purposes when the 
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defendant elects to testify in his own behalf, and we have expressed 
concern about the use of convictions. 
[76-77] The closest one [opinion that I have written] that I can re-
call was a case involving the execution of a search warrant which pur-
suant to a statute authorized entry into a domicile if entry had been re-
fused. The officers knocked down the door, and a few seconds later, 
busted it down, and entered a home and conducted a search. We found 
that the waiting of an interval of 2 or 3 seconds did not constitute con-
sent. 
[77] I think it is true that the public sometimes has difficulty un-
derstanding why evidence which tends to establish guilt in a fairly con-
vincing way must be excluded from trial, it is somewhat inconsistent 
with the truth determining function of the trial, but of course the coun-
tervailing value at stake is the great interest in the privacy of the citizen 
and the concern that, unless the exclusionary rule is enforced, there 
may not be an adequate deterrent to police conduct which none of us 
would approve. So again there is a tension here. 
[78] I don't hesitate in saying that I think one of the most impor-
tant aspects of procedural fairness is availability of counsel to the liti-
gant on either side. I could not overemphasize the importance of the 
lawyer's role in the adversary process and it is unquestionably a matter 
of major importance in all litigation. 
O'Connor: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[73] I think it is a serious concern to a lot of people that there is no 
finality in the criminal justice field to a given decision, even after an 
appeal has been heard and resolved, long after the conviction in ques-
tion, and even after one series of post-conviction petitions for relief, 
there are others that can be followed in an unending series. I think that 
is one thing that has caused the public to have some concern about the 
proper function of the judicial system in that area. 
[79] [T]he exclusionary rule, of course, is one that has caused gen-
eral public discontent on occasion with the function of the criminal jus-
tice system, to the extent that perfectly valid, relevant evidence is ex-
cluded solely on the basis that it was obtained in violation of some 
occasionally technical requirement. 
[80] It [the exclusionary rule] is in fact I think a judge-made rule 
as opposed to one of constitutional dimensions, as I understand it. As a 
result, the Supreme Court presumably could alter that judge-made rule 
without doing violence to some constitutional provision or principle. 
There have been expressions by several sitting Justices that they would 
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like to reexamine that. I think the rule may well come before the Court 
and could well be the subject of a reexamination. 
[129] If people have been previously convicted of offenses and 
these convictions are known, or if for example someone has been 
charged with an offense and released on bail and then charged again 
with another offense and these factors in the record are known, these 
things perhaps-speaking purely as a matter of personal belief and not 
as a reflection on the legal issues involved-possibly merit considera-
tion in the determination of bail. 
[146] My experience ... is that the application of Miranda has not 
resulted in an inability of the police to still be reasonably successful in 
their efforts to gain information and obtain statements. It has, no 
doubt. precluded some but on a broad, general basis I cannot say that I 
think the police have been unable to cope with it. 
(146-147] I think the exclusionary rule, from my simple observa-
tion ... , has proven to be much more difficult in terms of the admini-
stration of justice. There are times when perfectly relevant evidence 
and, indeed, sometimes the only evidence in the case has been ex-
cluded by application of a rule which, if different standards were ap-
plied maybe would not have been applied in that situation, for instance, 
to good faith conduct on the part of the police. I am not suggesting, and 
do not want to be interpreted as suggesting that I think it is inappropri-
ate where force or trickery or some other reprehensible conduct has 
been used but I have seen examples of the application of the rule which 
I thought were unfortunate .... 
[147] I would not think that the Miranda rule has actually affected 
the crime rate. Conceivably, the exclusionary rule has had some effect 
in some areas of the crime rate, possibly drug enforcement. 
[166] But we must, I think, within the judicial system itself strive 
constantly to resolve criminal cases rapidly. I think delay in that area 
simply promotes a disillusionment of people with the ability of the sys-
tem to function. So we have to be concerned about the speed in which 
we handle these matters. I think we have to be concerned within the 
judicial branch about at what point we can say that a case has been 
fairly litigated and fairly reviewed on appeal or on post-conviction re-
view and now it is at an end. There must be some way to more effec-
tively do that. That has to be a concern of people on the bench as well 
as legislators. We have to be concerned, I suppose, with the imposition 
of fair and appropriate remedies. It will always be a concern, I am sure, 
to judges on the bench that there are appropriate facilities in which to 
place convicted defendants if an incarcerative sentence is appropriate. 
We have to be concerned, I think, with insuring that there is the power 
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at least to order those who are convicted to make restitution in appro-
priate instances and the means of enforcing that. 
[204] My experience with the criminal justice system has resulted 
in some disappointments in the lack of effectiveness; the recidivism 
rate is extremely high, and the crime rate generally is extremely high. 
We have to ask why .... If there is a way to provide more prison space, 
it is evident that there is a great need for that at both the State and the 
Federal level. 
[211] [W]ithout expressing any opinion on the eighth amendment 
implications, if any, I am generally in favor of giving trial judges discre-
tion to impose lengthy sentences if necessary, including up to life sen-
tences, for repeat offenders. That concept seems to me to be generally 
a valid one. It has been my observation that a life sentence can be a lot 
shorter in actuality than a lengthy term of years. Be that as it may, I 
think discretion is appropriate. 
Scalia: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[34] As to the second part [of your question], Senator, what do I 
think of [Miranda] warnings, I am happy to answer it as a policy mat-
ter, assuming the question is not, you know, what do I think as to the 
extent to which those warnings, in one circumstance or another, are re-
quired by the Constitution. As a policy matter, I think-as far as I 
know, everybody thinks-it is a good idea to warn a suspect of his 
rights as soon as it is practicable. I do not know of anyone who thinks it 
should be otherwise. 
[35] Q: Would you favor some limitation on the extent of the 
number of post-trial appeals which allow inmates under death sen-
tences to avoid executions for years after the commission of their 
crimes? A: Well, Senator, nobody likes frivolous appeals, I suppose, in 
any matter, criminal or civil. But to the extent that your question is ask-
ing about legislation, I should not have a view about it. 
[87] Q: What about the speedy trial, public trial and jury trial pro-
visions of the 6th amendment; are they incorporated under the due 
process clause? A: Indeed. 
[87-88] Q: And impartial trial, notice of charges, confrontation, 
compulsory process, right to counsel, under the 6th amendment [and 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8th amendment]; are 
they incorporated by the due process clause of the 14th amendment? 
A: That is what the cases have held, and it would be massive change to 
go back on them. 
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Ginsburg: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[217] One of the things that I have done every other year with my 
law clerks ... is to visit the local jail and ... the nearest penitentiary. 
We visited ... the facility for the criminally insane .... I do that to ex-
pose myself to those conditions, and also for my law clerks. Most of 
them will go on to practice in large law firms specializing in corporate 
business, and won't see the law as it affects most people. That is one of 
the things I do to stay in touch. 
[229-230] One of the cases in which I participated-a decision the 
Supreme Court reversed-might serve as an example. The case in-
volved the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court had decided that if 
police officers stop a car, open the trunk and find a suitcase in it, they 
can't open the suitcase without a warrant. Cases then trooped before 
the lower courts involving other containers in cars-cardboard boxes 
and plastic bags, for example. Lower courts began to draw a "luggage 
line"; some applied a "worthy container" doctrine to determine when 
police officers needed a warrant. One was needed for a leather suit-
case, for sure; lower courts were not so sure about lesser containers. 
My court, in that time of uncertainty, got the case of a leather pouch 
and a paper bag, side-by-side in a car trunk. The three-judge panel held 
that the police needed a warrant before they could open the leather 
pouch, but didn't need a warrant to open the paper bag, because it was 
a flimsy, unworthy container. I wrote an opinion for the full court say-
ing we have now seen an array of container cases, going from the 
leather suitcase to the lowly paper bag, and we can't expect police offi-
cers to make worthy container judgments on the spot. Either you can 
open a container or you can't without a warrant. Because the Supreme 
Court held that police officers could not open a suitcase without a war-
rant, my court held police could not open any closed container without 
a warrant. 
[263] Q: Do you believe ... that the death penalty under all cir-
cumstances ... is incompatible with the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment? A: At least since 1972 and, 
if you date it from Furman, even earlier, the Supreme Court, by large 
majorities, has rejected the position that the death penalty under any 
and all circumstances is unconstitutional. ... I can tell you that I do not 
have a closed mind on this subject. I don't think it would be consistent 
with the line I have tried to hold to tell you that I will definitely accept 
or definitely reject any position. I can tell you that I am well aware of 
the precedent, and I have already expressed my views on the value of 
precedent. 
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[296] Q: (Is it] improper for a trial court ... to impose a harsher 
sentence on a defendant who chooses to exercise his or her constitu-
tional right to a trial rather than plead guilty? A: You can't punish 
someone for exercising a constitutional right. If you punish someone 
for exercising a constitutional right, that person has no right. 
[327] [327] The purpose of the Miranda warnings is to make cer-
tain that a defendant's rights are known to the defendant, so the defen-
dant can exercise them- the right not to speak and the information 
that, if you do, your words can be used against you, the right to an at-
torney and the knowledge that if you are unable to pay for counsel, a 
lawyer will be provided for you by the State. Those, it seems to me, are 
constitutional rights that should be brought home to every defendant. 
Now, sophisticated defendants will know them without being told, but 
the unsophisticated won't. This practical approach, the Miranda warn-
ings, has become familiar to all, thanks to television. I think it has 
worked. 
[315-316] Q: How do you feel about the mandatory [minimum] 
penalties? Are they putting too much discretion over sentencing in the 
hands of prosecutors, and not in the hands of judges? A: [T]here was 
recently published a very intelligent comment by Judge Weinstein of 
the Eastern District of New York concerning mandatory sentences. He 
recommended appointment of a commission to do a careful study of 
how they are working out in practice. The perception is very strong 
among many judges ... that it is deceptive to think discretion has been 
removed. It has indeed been removed from the sentencing judges, be-
cause mandatory minimums don't give the judges any choice .... So 
the judges' sense is that the discretion has been transferred from them 
to the prosecutor, who can choose to indict for a lesser weight [of a 
drug] than the weight actually found at the time the defendant was ar-
rested. There is much concern that these mandatory minimum sen-
tences are transferring discretion from the judge to the prosecutor and 
that they may be deceptive in other respects, because the likelihood of 
apprehension- not the sentence length- may be the strongest deter-
rent. ... So I think the time has come when a study, a close look at 
how mandatory minimums have been working would make a contribu-
tion of great value. 
(335-336] I can only tell you the code of conduct I would adopt for 
myself wherever I am, here or abroad, and that is the Constitution of 
the United States. I would consider it binding on me. I can perhaps cite 
an example. [A] former Federal judge ... was sent to judge a hijacking 
in Berlin. It was a sensitive case in the international community. A 
plane was hijacked from Poland, I believe, to take people who had 
been in East Germany into West Germany. The hijacking presented a 
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sensitive question within Germany. So a court that had been created in 
World War II, called the United States Court for Berlin, was resur-
rected, and a U.S. district judge, Judge Stern was sent there. He was 
told by the State Department that the alleged hijackers would have 
only such rights as the State Department chose to give them. Judge 
Stern, said, I am a Federal judge, the Constitution is my law, and that is 
the law I am going to apply in any proceeding over which I preside. He 
made sure that the defendants had very able counsel ... and that they 
got the full panoply of rights we accord criminal defendants .... It is a 
wonderful example, I think, of the way any Federal official should be-
have at home or abroad. The Constitution and the Federal law should 
be our guide wherever we are. 
Souter: Rights of Criminal Defendants 
[178] I was in law enforcement once, and there were times when I 
used to chafe over the difficulty that law enforcement had in conform-
ing to some of the [Supreme Court's] decisions. One of the things I am 
glad of is that that is an era which has, in large measure, passed. We do 
not have the same problems that we had 20 years ago. There are some 
who would say there is a greater pragmatic appreciation on the Su-
preme Court .... We have learned to live with much in the last 20 years, 
and we have lived with it reasonably well. 
[205] [T]he basis for the exclusionary rule [as explained in Mapp 
v. Ohio] was to induce the police, to induce the executive branch of the 
government from engaging in activities which violated 4th amendment 
rights, and the theory was that if the police could not profit, if the 
prosecution could not profit by using evidence illegally seized, there 
would therefore be an inducement to avoid seizing evidence illegally, 
so that the object of the exclusionary rule as a means to enforce the 
values of the fourth amendment was a very pragmatic one. But the fo-
cus of that explanation was, of course, on police conduct. ... (W]hat 
the Leon :::ase is saying is that if the mistake which leads us to conclude 
that there has been a 4th amendment violation was a mistake not made 
by the police, but made by the judge or a magistrate who issued the 
warrant, that should not preclude the introduction of evidence on the 
theory described in Mapp. If the mistake is not the police's mistake, 
then you gain nothing in influencing police conduct by keeping the evi-
dence out. ... I think the Leon rule is entirely consistent with the ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule in Mapp. 
(208] I would not take the position, I do not think anyone takes 
the position that sentences have got to be imposed absolutely, without 
judicial discretion. But I do think very strongly that the judicial discre-
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tion which is exercised in sentencing should be a very structured and 
disciplined discretion, otherwise the problem of disparity in sentencing 
is simply insoluable .... My concern about the effectiveness of this 
perception of injustice is not limited simply to the perception of the 
public. I think there should be an equal concern for the perception of 
the defendants who are sentenced. If there is going to be any hope for 
any rehabilitative effect in sentencing, particularly on young and early 
offenders, it seems to me it has got to rest upon a reasonable percep-
tion that the system in which the sentence has been imposed is itself a 
fair system. 
[208] [T]here was for a long time, certainly in the early years in 
which I was practicing law and engaged in the criminal justice system. 
an unspoken feeling that somehow the white collar criminal should at 
least get one free chance or the feeling that the white collar criminal, 
even when caught, should never in fact be sentenced to incarceration. 
This seemed to me was both morally unjust and socially indefensible. 
[226-228] Q: Your dissenting opinion seemed to recognize the im-
portance of the State's interest [in detecting drunk drivers]. I would 
appreciate it if you could explain your reasoning. A: I think one of the 
points of common ground from which all of the parties and all of those 
with strong opinions on that case begin is that when there is a stop for a 
sobriety checkpoint, there is, to a very limited degree, a search and sei-
zure and inquiry subject to 4th amendment standards .... What ... the 
court did-and what, indeed, I did in my dissent-was to engage basi-
cally in an analysis which balanced the State and the private interests 
involved to determine whether the stop and the inquiry could be re-
garded as a reasonable one within the standards applicable to search 
and seizures .... What we are particularly concerned with in these 
kinds of cases is that the discretion of the police be something other 
than an uncontrolled roving ... The concern is to require a very tightly 
controlled discretion on the part of the police ... which does not go 
one iota beyond what is necessary to satisfy the public interest in de-
tecting driving under the influence before a tragedy occurs .... I said 
that in judging what is reasonable, we have to take into consideration 
the potential danger which the activity poses and the State's expression 
of that danger by its decision to regulate or not to regulate it. And what 
might, indeed, be a perfectly reasonable inquiry in a highly dangerous 
and regulated activity, like driving, would not be reasonable at all in an 
innocent pursuit like walking down Main Street and doing errands. 
And I therefore concluded that there was not a danger, that a sobriety 
checkpoint approval under the 4th amendment was going to be taken 
as thin end of the wedge for an assault on civil liberties. I think that 
view has since been recognized. 
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[248] I recognize that, as a simple matter of the text, the Constitu-
tion of the United States recognizes capital punishment. Beyond that, 
given the fact that there will be capital punishment cases before the 
Court and I believe are on its docket now, I do not think I can go very 
far on a discussion, without getting into something that is going to be 
before the Court. 
[280] [T]he issue that we had to confront in that case is whether to 
recognize that there are certain constitutional rights of a defendant, 
which are indeed so personal and fundamental that they may not be 
waived by someone on the defendant's behalf, that they would be ex-
ceptions to the general rule the defendant is bound by decisions of 
counsel, and we held in that case that the right of a trial by a full jury 
was indeed just such a right, and because the defendant had not on the 
record indicated a waiver of his right to 12, we reversed the conviction. 
